The focus in the United States over the Iran crisis has been on air attacks on Iran. A ground invasion against such a large and populous country is not an option. But could ground forces be decisive in the Strait of Hormuz to hold open oil export routes?
America has moved air, naval, and ground-based air defenses into the Middle East in a growing confrontation with Iran. The situation is mostly a regime and nuclear issue, but the situation in the crucial oil export routes through the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman is also dangerous. Russian and Chinese warships even joined an Iranian exercise in the strait.
Iran’s ultimate option against intervention is to interfere with Gulf Arab oil exports to a world that relies on them:
Iran has launched military drills in the Strait of Hormuz to cement control over the critical waterway following the deployment of a second US aircraft carrier to the region.
The Navy is much smaller than when it led allied convoy operations during the Iran-Iraq War. As I discussed in this Army article, past American experience when dealing with Islamist threats at sea show the power and flexibility of naval action but also the limits. And Victory through Airpower overstates what air attacks can achieve beyond killing people and breaking things.1 I explored that single-domain thinking over the former Yugoslavia. Ground operations against Iran may be needed to supplement air attacks to prevent Iran from interrupting oil exports through the Hormuz Strait.
Iran has held three UAE islands near the Strait of Hormuz since even before the Iranian revolution: Abu Musa, Greater (Bozorge) Tunb, and Lesser (Kouchak) Tunb. I speculated about Marine operations against those Gulf islands.
In the 17 years since I wrote that, Arab Gulf states have greatly strengthened their air and naval forces. Gulf Arab states in the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council may be able to act, with the UAE taking the lead on their three islands. The Saudis could take Sirri Island. A common enemy might heal some wounds. U.S. Marine units with special forces assistance could take Larak Island and the naval base on Qeshm Island.
Yet even limited American ground operations on Iranian islands could become an unwelcome lengthy standoff if the mullah regime in Iran does not fall under pressure internally or comply with our demands from single-domain military action (air) and economic pressure. In the Earnest Will escort missions during the Iran-Iraq War, America was saved from an open-ended naval mission by events on land:
The combination of Iraqi battlefield dominance and Tehran’s perception that America was willing to stop at nothing to crush Iran led the Ayatollah Khomeini to accept U. N. Resolution No. 598, which called for an end to the war. On July 16, 1988, Iran formally accepted the resolution.
That Arab division of labor for seizing Iranian-occupied islands would allow America to withdraw troops once the crisis is resolved one way or another—whether the mullahs fall or just get weakened by a punitive mission—while Arab states could hold the islands they stand on to get the UAE islands back by holding Sirri Island as a bargaining chip.
It is true that Iran’s mullahs will define surviving an air campaign as a victory. On the other hand, the mullahs have been at war with America (the “Great Satan”) since they took our Tehran diplomats hostage. The mullahs don’t define their victory in this long conflict as our immediate destruction. Hurting the mullahs may have to be sufficient for America. For now.
Land operations on islands aren’t a silver bullet. Yet they might add to the pressure on the mullah regime without getting entangled on the mainland. But there are limits without the ability of the Iranian people themselves to decisively influence events on the mainland.
NOTE: Top map from Maritime Education. I added the arrows. The map of the situation early in February is from ISW.
One thing I dislike about the essay is discussing “exit strategies”. Yes, knowing what you will do if your main plan fails is good. And my essay is in part doing that by looking for means to deal with failure to destroy the mullah regime in a potential war that will be limited in its means and duration. But “exit strategies” are always tainted in my mind by an unstated assumption that you will lose and must figure out when and how to lose with less pain. I’d rather focus on victory if we decide to send our forces into battle.