A Thousand Grains of PLA Sand Landing on Taiwan Will Create a Beachhead
China appreciates the difficulties more than we do and will plan to overcome them
Taking Taiwan (the Republic of China) has long been the most core of China’s (the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) core interests. Yet after decades of China’s massive military modernization, China doesn’t have the means to invade Taiwan? I think a little here and a little there, and pretty soon you are talking real troop numbers landing on Taiwan. There are certainly many reasons offered in the West for why China can’t possibly invade, notwithstanding their massive military build up.
Do read it all.
But China knows what kind of threat it will face crossing the Taiwan Strait to invade Taiwan. Either China knows it is doomed and so will not try to invade Taiwan. Or China thinks it has ways to counter Taiwan's likely defense efforts. China is certainly practicing seriously:
When [INDOPACOM commander Admiral] Paparo took command of U.S. Pacific Fleet in 2021, the Chinese military did a summer exercise with one brigade. The following year, the exercise grew to six brigades. In summer 2024, it was 42 brigades—as well as 150 Chinese navy vessels, 200 amphibious assault craft practicing “breach of obstacles and outward movement to military operations in urban terrain,” he said.
I hope this conclusion is true, notwithstanding China’s expanding capabilities:
It is clear that while China has maintained a modern Marine force with amphibious capability, they had not maintained the amphibious capability to invade Taiwan. Their Marine force is structured for use elsewhere, not Taiwan. It is clear, based upon their military capabilities, that they currently have no real plans to invade Taiwan.
The total amphibious capability is given as 20,000 in the initial lift with amphibious warships. I certainly respect the author's expertise. I even agree that China's marines and amphibious warfare ships are for global peacetime power projection and aren't sized or intended for the main role in an invasion of Taiwan.
But I don't think it is safe to assume that China has no real plans to invade Taiwan just because China doesn't maintain an amphibious warfare structure sufficient to invade Taiwan as America would.
And consider that even before Force Design changes to America’s Marines, our Navy could only lift about two Marine brigades for an amphibious assault. America couldn't invade Taiwan with the assumptions that are claimed doom China. And Lord knows what post-Force Design Marines could manage.
Taiwan has 100,000 troops on active duty, but it couldn’t rush many of them to repel a much smaller first wave of troops landing. No more than Germany could rapidly move its larger ground forces in France to crush the relatively small Allied June 1944 Normandy Invasion force. Remember, too, that Taiwan defends its islands close to China as well as the Pescadores Islands just off of Taiwan’s west coast. China could bombard and isolate them, leaving the garrisons to wither on the vine. So Taiwan doesn’t have even 100,000 for the decisive campaign. But I will call it 100,000, assuming Taiwan’s marines make up for its troops on islands away from Taiwan itself.
And just because Taiwan could destroy its ports and lay minefields off its coasts to deny China easy entry, how many times would China need to mobilize for an invasion just to bait Taiwan into destroying its own ports and mining its coasts—only to hear China announce its is carrying out an exercise to practice disaster response in the region—before Taiwanese got upset at their own government for crippling their economy for no reason?
China’s exercises are moving toward that level of potential imminent threat:
The rapid increase in aggressive actions and drills [simulating an invasion of Taiwan] has also made it more possible that the “fig leaf of an exercise” could disguise intentions, the [INDOPACOM commander] said—adding that AI “would be a very effective tool to suss out that kind of warning.”
Artificial Intelligence could detect the difference between feint and looming invasion? Maybe.
But I digress.
In addition to China’s dedicated amphibious warfare ships that could deliver People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops and equipment to Taiwan, I’d add in a number of other means. Strategypage has often called China’s approach to intelligence gathering “a thousand grains of sand.” Gather lots of information, mostly seemingly trivial, and eventually you can piece it together for something significant. A figurative beach. That approach could work for an invasion that doesn’t overly fixate on amphibious warfare ships and marines. A lot of my numbers below are semi wild-ass guesses (WAGS) with a lot of assumptions built in. Consider this illustrative rather than quantitative analysis:
Aircraft that can drop paratroopers. The DOD says China has 51 large Y-20A transports. The report says China has a total of 500 transport aircraft. This recent U.S. Naval Academy study reported that nearly a decade ago, China could lift “only one airborne division at a time[.]” So let me guess one lift per day of 10,000 troops.
Aircraft that can airlift troops to captured or undefended airfields—or to stretches of highway that Taiwan has prepared for emergency airfields. The DOD writes: “The PRC’s aviation industry continues to advance with deliveries of its domestic Y-20 large transport aircraft and completion of the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600. These transports will supplement and eventually replace the PRC’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which, to date, consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft.” Once some PLA air superiority has been established, airlifts rather than air drops could be carried out. Also, the seaplanes could land off the coast or in bodies of water. Add in civilian planes from China’s aviation sector and even with losses, airlifts could continue. Just for convenience, I’ll say this airlift method could continue the air drop total when the airborne units are dropped, to maintain the same number of troops moved per day by large aircraft.
Dedicated amphibious warfare ships. They can lift 20,000 PLA marines or army troops per wave. I’ll assume a wave per day. Although ship losses will reduce that over time. As will a shift to moving supplies. So call it 20,000 on D-Day and 5,000 per day average after. This is an interesting way to get around that “Taiwan can defend or sabotage the ports” obstacle to use civilian ships to move troops or supplies (tip to PJ Media): “China is building at least five new special purpose barges which appear tailor made for amphibious assault. The barges (the illustration above is this ship class) may provide the PRC (People's Republic of China) with a unique way to offload large numbers of tanks directly onto Taiwanese roads.” These barges could bridge from the sea to the shore away from traditional beaches, allowing Chinese military-compliant civilian ships to unload troops and vehicles onto the barges. This could be a means to reinforce a smaller Marine bridgehead, too, freeing amphibious warships to move on to other missions. I’ll be cautious and guess 5,000 troops per day, but more importantly, armored vehicles, heavy weapons and supplies would be the primary benefit.
Helicopters and other aerial transports flying from China’s mainland. I’ve long speculated about this source of troops. The Pentagon says: “Three Z-8 transport aircraft battalions could airdrop a combat battalion in one lift. The Z-20 is expected to fill a variety of missions, including special force insertion and shipborne ASW.” China developed a VTOL that can reach Taiwan. It can carry 4,400 pounds or ten passengers up to 2,400 miles away. Shorter with a round trip, of course. The USNA study cites about 400 helicopters. It also says China doesn’t have real training for this mission. But the potential is there. Let me assume no more than 100 of those VTOLs to match China’s heavy helicopter count. I’ll assume 500 combined “other” aircraft, with half used—allowing a constant number to be used despite losses—and assume just 10 fully equipped troops per craft, per day. I’ll also conservatively assume one sortie per aircraft per day for troops rather than for supplies. So 2,500 troops.
Military-compliant Chinese civilian transport ships carrying troops and equipment directly into Taiwanese ports. As a WAG (informed by port information I discuss in #8 below), let’s say 10,000 troops with equipment per day, starting on the second day.
Old China Coast Guard vessels carrying troops and then providing limited fire support and air defense. As a WAG, call it 5,000 light troops with minimal equipment per day.
Special forces infiltrated into Taiwan—many posing as civilians. Civilians totaling 1.4 million from China, Hong Kong, and Macao visit each year. Infiltrators could arrive in the weeks and days prior to invasion. If Chinese forces arriving in Taiwan before D-Day can seize control of ports before the Taiwanese army can defend the ports or destroy their facilities, China Coast Guard ships—part of the world’s largest coast guard—sailing into those ports could reinforce them with light forces. What fraction of the 100,000 tourists in a month prior to invasion could be PLA troops of varying quality? Mind you, much of what special forces will do are force multiplier special operations rather than just being more infantry. They will be the minority of such troops. But I want numbers here. And Ranger-level troops could perform light infantry missions for operational objectives, such as assaulting a key command-and-control facility. Perhaps 10,000 as a one-time insertion. I suspect I may estimate too many, but even with fewer, the numbers aren’t affected that much. So I’ll stand on that number.
Chinese civilian merchant ships already in Taiwanese ports on the day of invasion carrying hidden troops and equipment. Taiwan has 8 major ports that handle nearly 6,000 ships per year at or near Taipei; nearly 6,000 south of the capital on both coasts able to block Taiwanese reinforcements going north to fight the main effort; and over 14,000 in the more southern ports that could be minor distractions and/or targets of opportunity to expand bridgeheads if Taiwanese resistance is weak. How many of China’s “ghost ships” could be in Taiwanese ports, with loads of troop, supplies, and equipment in their shipping containers? “The Taiwanese government has created a blacklist of 52 PRC-owned ships that warrant greater scrutiny to keep track of the PRC’s growing “shadow fleet” of ostensibly commercial vessels that act on behalf of the PRC.” If you assume China can time the arrival of even four ships in the Taipei area (a quarter of the 16 per day), four in the blocking areas; and nine in the distraction areas, that’s 17 ships that could hide 17,000 troops as a WAG for a one-time insertion. Plus supplies and equipment in shipping containers.
Equipment and supplies purchased and stored in warehouses on Taiwan useful to infiltrated or invading Chinese troops, especially paratroopers. How many small suicide drones could be readied inside Taiwan? Further, China can reduce the amount of supplies it must move across the Taiwan Strait by looting Taiwan’s civilian economy for many consumables and vehicles. Not a lot compared to ammunition, combat vehicles, and other weapons. But every grain of sand adds up.
I start with 100,000 Taiwanese ground troops on Taiwan ready to fight against conventional forces. I will assume 50,000 are deployed in the critical northern zones around the capital, Taipei. I will further assume that 5,000 per day are shifted north to that region as reservists replace them as garrisons. A wild card for how quickly Taiwan can mass troops is how much confusion can military traitors recruited by China sow? Plus fake orders, sabotage by infiltrators, and kinetic strikes on lines of communication and command-and-control infrastructure.
The reservists won’t be well equipped or nearly as well trained, but you have to take risks. And risking quiet sectors not invaded yet is better than holding the best troops away from the actual invasion just in case. Don’t make the mistake the Germans made in June 1944 in holding forces at Calais because leadership knew for too long that Normandy was a diversion.
China starts with 69,000 landing or present on D-Day. Then it could land 37,000 per day on subsequent days. But I will assume that on D + 4 that the daily rate drops to a quarter—9,000—of additional troops in order to shift cargo space to equipment and supplies. This is a super WAG on my part.
So what could the cumulative numbers on Taiwan in the decisive north look like—not counting losses—for ten days of war? One-time D-Day landings plus the daily WAGs on reinforcements.
__________________CHINA_______________TAIWAN
D-Day_____________69,000_________________50,000
D + 1_____________106,000_________________55,000
D + 2_____________143,000_________________60,000
D + 3_____________180,000_________________65,000
D + 4_____________189,000_________________70,000
D + 5_____________198,000_________________75,000
D + 6_____________207,000_________________80,000
D + 7_____________216,000_________________85,000
D + 8_____________225,000_________________90,000
D + 9_____________234,000_________________95,000
I’ll end it there after ten days. I don’t know what Taiwan’s supply of ammunition is to sustain the fight without American resupply. I won’t try to estimate casualties. And I don’t know how long it will take America and its allies to push supplies into Taiwan or to significantly intervene. Nor do I know how quickly China could exploit captured port facilities. Heck, maybe some of Taiwan’s reservists can be whipped into shape to add replacements or new forces rather than simply be rear area garrisons.
Another grain of sand could come from fire support by aircraft and missiles from ships that can return to port to reload or from the Chinese mainland which eliminates the need to dispatch every bolt and shell across the Taiwan Strait needed to sustain fire support on Taiwan.
The aggregate of all the means to push men and materiel across the strait—or to have alternatives that reduce the need to push as much across for the same capabilities—could add up to enough of a force. A thousand grains of sand could become a beachhead.
Further, claims about how much China needs to throw across the Taiwan Strait are often defined by how much force China would need to advance on Taipei, the capital, and capture it.
I won’t even address the nonsense sometimes raised of China having to overcome Taiwanese resistance retreating into the mountains. In that scenario, China would control the cities and productive parts of Taiwan and let the die-hards in the mountains starve while China ethnically cleanses the cities and lowlands. I suspect Han settlers will be moved in and many native Taiwanese will be shipped to Tibet and Xinjiang to serve as Han substitutes to dilute indigenous populations to make them easier to control and ultimately erase with demographics.
But I digress again. As I can.
Even aside from not understanding the 3:1 rule by claiming China needs an overall advantage of 3:1 to successfully invade and drive on Taipei, China won’t need as many ground units ashore if you turn that math around and ask how much force would China need to land in order to repel a Taiwanese effort to drive the invaders into the sea. China certainly would win if it drives on Taipei and captures it. But China doesn’t lose the war if it fails to capture Taipei. China wins if it remains on Taiwan when a ceasefire is achieved, as I explored in Military Review.
And those CSIS simulations of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan that got so much attention a couple years ago included this detail:
In the recent simulations, China succeeds in occupying positions in the north of the island, but Chinese forces get bogged down with fierce Taiwan resistance, resulting in a grinding ground battle.
So the simulation judged the Chinese could get ashore in significant numbers, it seems. And “getting bogged down” works both ways. Even if China’s drive on Taipei is stalled, if Taiwan can’t drive the PLA into the sea, China could decide to go on the defensive to reduce its logistics needs and put the pressure on Taiwan’s small military to attack on a large scale.
Say, how’s that Ukrainian counteroffensive to drive dug-in Russian invaders from its soil going?
China could resume the offensive when it establishes the logistics ashore to do so. Will America want its war with a nuclear-armed peer to continue until that is achieved? And if a ceasefire is established while China is on the defensive in its bridgeheads, China will use the “peace” to establish the logistics to resume the offensive even if that takes several years for world attention to wander away.
Sure, if Taiwan can lay mines and wreck its ports; defend its coast; shoot down planes, drones, and missiles; and sink ships in that America-designed “Hellscape” plan, China’s invasion force could be doomed. But can Taiwan and America do all that sufficiently?
If China is willing to accept 21,000 killed in action to get and remain ashore—which I think is close enough to victory for CCP work—can the Hellscape inflict enough damage to matter? Would it be more or less than that level of losses? China surely knows it is vulnerable in such circumstances. If China invades Taiwan, China will believe it has counter-measures. China certainly works to gain the information on what it must overcome:
Taiwan’s intelligence bureau says China’s main spy agency is working with criminal gangs, shell companies and other dubious partners to gain intelligence on Taiwan’s defenses, resulting in a major rise in those arrested for alleged espionage on the island.
Current and retired Taiwanese military personnel are a special concern, accounting for around half of the 64 alleged spies put on trial last year, it said. That number is up from 16 in 2021 and 10 in 2022.
Maybe the Chinese Communist Party will be correct that it has the means to overcome Taiwanese resistance. And will America intervene quickly and effectively enough to matter to the outcome?
This doesn't mean China's invasion will succeed. Both sides “vote” in a war. And while nobody knows how China can cast its vote because of corruption, I’m not sure if Taiwanese morale against such a large invasion will hold up enough for them to vote at all.
I think China could cross the Taiwan Strait and may decide even failure might benefit the Chinese Communist Party in charge. And claiming China can't invade increases China's chance of success.
NOTE: The image is from Naval News.