Can Europe Form a New Defense Architecture?

And if it does, would its purpose be defense?

So far, Europe has failed to cope with the internal resistance to a proto-imperial European Union (EU); and to the reduced American need to be a first among equals within NATO. Can Europe find another path?

Blaming the diverging interests of America and Europeans on Trump displays a lack of feel for the European history and politics regarding reliance on America. Even when America needed to be strong in Europe, there were strong currents within America seeking to escape its burdens defending Europe. But that blame-America instinct is the unfortunate background noise for serious discussions these days.

But I digress.

What can Europeans do to overcome internal divisions and the lack of American power to herd the cats? This is the suggestion by the initially linked authors:

To ensure both strategic autonomy and inclusivity, Europe needs a reformed order centered on treaty-based cooperation among the continent’s liberal democracies, including both EU members and nonmembers. It should be built around an innovative institutional structure in which different clusters of states participate to varying degrees across all areas of policy. Unlike ad hoc coalitions of the willing, this model would be anchored by an institutional core. Each cluster would establish its own governance arrangements led by the governments of participating states and would be subject to oversight—by an appointed intergovernmental secretariat, perhaps, or a parliamentary body composed of representatives from the cluster’s member states. Countries would join these clusters voluntarily—likely through agreements on certain areas of policy—allowing for some overlap in memberships to different clusters. Nordic and Mediterranean states with complementary energy profiles could unite in a climate cluster, for example. Ukraine could cooperate fully with European states on foreign and security policies without having to wait for the result of formal EU accession talks.

That seems appealing on the surface. Certainly dethroning Brussels before it can strip the inconvenient prefix is laudable.

Multiple alliances will allow Europeans to enter into the cluster buffet and pick and choose among the options.

But the security policies clusters will always be the key. Lesser common interests could already be addressed with special arrangements, no?

And we already have one security cluster—the Joint Expeditionary Force that links a number of Nordic and Baltic states in a non-NATO military body.

What other clusters would arise? Russia would be its own cluster with whatever vassals it can yoke to its cart. Belarus, certainly. And as much of Ukraine as it can capture.

Could we see the Entente Cluster formed? Or a Central Cluster. Perhaps there could be a Cluster of Steel. Maybe a Little Entente Cluster.

The Holy Roman Cluster, anyone?

Without American leadership, security cluster interests will eventually trump whatever phone-charging cable standardization cluster forms.

What could possibly go wrong?

Europe could defend itself. With time. By design it doesn't without America to knit together atomized European capabilities. We should of course want stronger European--but not EU--military power within America-led NATO. We must not indulge in a reboot of "leading from behind" that pretends other countries will fight for American interests without consequences[.]

Still, how badly can Europe go wrong this century?

Perhaps the most important question today, then, is whether Europe will remain what the United States invented – a region of many languages but common interests – or revert to its more traditional and natural condition – small nations that have in common only fear of each other. Eighty years ago, the world shuddered at this question. But Europe is no longer a divided global empire. It is just a region like any other, and the imperial imperative of war is gone. How Europe decides to treat its ancient grudges and animosities will go far in answering the question of what Europe will do going forward.

Could even clusters of European states have global impact? Or would a war in Europe amongst themselves draw no more concern than the wars of Yugoslavia's break up?

Note too that the issue of the United Nations guaranteeing peace is not raised by those initial authors.

Yet while the first authors strike the EU, they do not kill it. They see a role for some universal objectives. I fear that such a plan—unless it restores the EU to the European Economic Community that is a mere trading bloc—will just force the Eurocrats into a Long March to "ever closer union" plans to overcome that kind of unfortunate setback. But an objective more possible with the absence of America in European affairs that created and kept them a continent of free democracies. The authors say America is attacking "European values." But I worry that autocracy is too strong of a value among too many Europeans in the Brussels orbit.

I believe that America should remain the first among equals in a robust if smaller role in NATO with an updated mission even after we have exited the Russian Decline Era.

That new three-part mission is:

I say the purpose of maintaining NATO is to keep the Russians out, the Germans involved in defense, and the European Union down.

America has interests in all three of those objectives. All of those objectives support America's strategic goal of keeping enemies from threatening America from the Atlantic Ocean.

A smaller American security interest in Europe because Russia is weaker and farther east—which is good—does not mean there is no Russian threat or that Russia will not rebuild its threat against Europe rather than face its real threat. Nor does it mean new threats won't emerge from within Europe or from abroad.

NOTE: I made the image with the Substack capability.