I’ve expressed my worry over the issue of China’s massive superiority of shipbuilding over America. That would handicap our ability to wage a long war with China. But laying keels isn’t the only measure of adding to fleet strength. The ability to smash the ships on the ways while under construction is part of the equation, too. And American forces at sea and ashore on allied territory can reach Chinese shipyards much more easily than China can reach American or European shipyards that could add to American production.
The worries about America’s shipbuilding deficit compared to China’s fill our media. America is seeking to expand its shipbuilding capacity to close the gap with China:
A new executive order is calling on U.S. senior leadership to create a maritime action plan by November, according to a document signed by President Trump on Wednesday.
The maritime executive order is pushing for a government-wide overhaul to the commercial maritime sector to revitalize U.S. shipbuilding as the Trump administration aims to blunt China’s dominance of commercial shipbuilding. …
Those tasks include a government-wide shipbuilding assessment by the heads of the Defense Department, State Department, Department of Transportation and Department of Homeland Security that will evaluate how the U.S. buys ships. A report that looks at how to grow the number of competitive U.S. shipyards and minimize both program delays and cost overages across the “surface, subsurface, and unmanned” platforms is due to President Donald Trump within 45 days of the EO’s signing, according to the language.
“This report must include separate itemized and prioritized lists of recommendations for the United States Army, Navy, and Coast Guard and shall be included in the MAP,” reads the EO.
While this EO is mostly focused on the commercial shipbuilding sector, the White House is expected to issue additional maritime executive orders, USNI News understands. It’s unclear what future EOs may look like.
America also looks to allies to supplement our lack of mass production ability that we used to build a whole new, modern flight to finish the World War II Pacific campaign.
Shipbuilding is only one part of the equation. What about destroying the shipyards and the ships under construction?
Let’s look at the map:
[Map from Researchgate.net]
China’s coast is well within range of American bases in the western Pacific. Add in American land-based missiles and aircraft placed on the Philippines and even Taiwan, and China’s ports and shipyards are well within range of American strike assets.
With long-range conventional missiles—including in the Army arsenal—and air-launched weapons on everything from Navy F-35s to the coming B-21 fleet in the Air Force that can fly from Guam and beyond, America has plenty of assets.
I’ll toss in missile-carried torpedoes for extra fun.
As for China, even Pearl Harbor is well east of the map. China can hit Guam—which is getting air defenses to cope—and locations closer in Japan, especially. But the continental United States is beyond easy reach.
Sure, China could get in early shots with hypersonic fractional orbit weapons or with whack-in-a-box container ships. But China lacks the ability to match America’s bases to consistently strike China’s assets.
How good are China’s air defenses? I mean, Russia hasn’t done very well against Ukraine’s MacGuyvered suicide drones flying deep into Russian territory.
How are China’s air defenses going to protect shipyards right on the coast from weapons better able to penetrate defenses?
Toss in America’s allies, too.
Then let’s talk about sea mines outside the ports. And nuclear-powered attack submarines hunting the PLA Navy ships that make it to sea.
China’s ability to strike American shipyards is real—but limited after the war starts when suspected threats can be sunk. America has strategic depth in the western Pacific, able to fall back two island chains or all the way back to the West Coast if needed to seek relatively safe places to refuel and re-arm. How far up China’s rivers can China pull its fleet back?
As I think more about the full situation that includes geographic vulnerabilities, I’m not feeling nearly as worried in the long run. I don’t know how long China can run wild with a short-term fleet edge in the western Pacific.
Of course, everybody has to crew and fill the magazines of the ships built. And sustain them in combat with adequate logistics. Shiny warships tied up at piers are not by themselves sea power.
NOTE: Photo from the U.S. Navy.