The Iran War of 2026 is impressive in the ability of air power to kill bad people and break their things. It provides positive and negative lessons about the importance of combined arms and joint operations. I look at three broad lessons already evident.
Learning lessons from the Winter War of 2022 is possible but they are necessarily more narrow lessons given that neither combatant in that war possesses full-spectrum military capabilities that America brings to a war. The Iran War of 2026 shows what a full-spectrum of American-Israeli capabilities can and cannot do in the air, at sea, and on the ground.
DRONE DEFENSE
Iran’s suicide drone threat has been weakened in part by using resources Russia and Ukraine lack at the scale America possesses, such as ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)—including from space—and conventional air power that has weakened the ability of Iran to launch sufficient drones to directly derail our war effort or by attacking regional allies to drive them from the coalition. I commented on this angle:
Observations that America and Western countries haven’t learned enough from Ukraine’s drone defense equipment and strategy to cope with Iran have a point. To an extent.
Consider that learning from Ukraine means being better at the “right of launch” mission of shooting down enemy suicide drones. America and our allies deployed some, but absolutely could have used more of that capability.
But America and Israel have broader capabilities with our old-style air forces and missile power. These have excelled at “left of launch” where we shoot the archers and not the arrows. Iranian suicide drone attacks have dropped dramatically.
No doubt Ukraine could use more of that capability.
Israeli fighter jets struck a group of operatives from Iran’s drone array at a launch site in western Iran shortly before they were set to launch drones toward Israel.
This doesn’t mean Iran isn’t shooting back. Enemies fight. Totally suppressing an enemy is extremely tough. Perhaps impossible. Especially in a large country like Iran.
Yet the results so far show that Big Air Force is not obsolete. Drones have taken over most of the ground attack role over the battlefield in Ukraine. But it doesn’t mean that must be the case for countries with actual air forces. Ukraine doesn’t have an air force capable of such contributions and Russia doesn’t believe it needs its air force for decisive ground attack.
GROUND FORCES
Despite the example of joint capabilities tackling a drone defense problem with both offensive action against Iran and defensive systems that for Ukraine is largely one dimensional—shooting down the drones on defense—lack of ground combat power, whether American or local, has meant America has not been able to fully exploit the gains from the offensive air campaign against Iran for a maximalist objective of overthrowing the Iranian mullah regime:
The Iran War of 2026 Seeks a Victory Condition
By waging war on the mullah regime of Iran, we will get either a weakened Iran less able to threaten us, its neighbors, or its people—for a while; or in a perfect world we get a friendly Iran. Getting the latter (call it Plan A) is something we are trying to enable. We are a force multiplier for that objective. But Iranians themselves must be the force …
Mind you, I believe Iran is too large by population and territory to invade and occupy, especially given its mountainous terrain and the large number of fanatical Shia jihadis who support the mullahs no matter how brutal the regime is or how much it impoverishes Iran. These regime supporters benefit from favorable economic treatment—all in the service of Allah. Win-win. Such fanatics may be a minority, but they are not helpless against troops on the ground despite the inability of sheer fanaticism to cope with sophisticated air and missile power.1
And our people would not support a large-scale mission even if it was within our capabilities. I mean, we have not even used limited ground power. Only now has a Navy/Marine Amphibious Readiness Group with a reinforced air-ground battalion been ordered to sail near Iran to move troops ashore for limited missions:
A Land Mission in the Persian Gulf
The focus in the United States over the Iran crisis has been on air attacks on Iran. A ground invasion against such a large and populous country is not an option. But could ground forces be decisive in the Strait of Hormuz to hold open oil export routes?
Although with friendly land bases nearby, the option of moving in elements of the 101st Airborne Division and Rangers opens up options apart from an ARG with its MEU. Depending on what happens on the ground inside Iran we may or may not decide on war objectives that require even limited American boots on limited ground.
Or maybe local allies who have naval and airmobile infantry could do the job with only American special forces assistance on the ground to capture the relevant islands.
Thus far, ground operations consist of fires units to join the air campaign, air defense that is now clearly something that more assets should be devoted to providing, radar, and logistics. There has been no use of ground combat maneuver units in the war. Although the war is early. Remember that the 1991 Persian Gulf War started with a Biblical level of bombardment for about forty days before ground combat commenced. Not that there is a massive coalition army poised to strike. Just saying lack of ground operations in this war doesn’t imply the need for them right now. But perhaps eventually they will be needed.2
SEA CONTROL
Finally, the ability of American air power to smash up the Iranian fleet in port and in nearby waters shows the potential of the Air Force has to hit Chinese vessels in Chinese ports or leaving port:
China Can Lay More Keels. But Can They Launch Them?
I’ve expressed my worry over the issue of China’s massive superiority of shipbuilding over America. That would handicap our ability to wage a long war with China. But laying keels isn’t the only measure of adding to fleet strength. The ability to smash the ships on the ways while under construction is part of the equation, too. And American forces at se…
And the war demonstrates that the Army has another means America’s joint force has to counter China’s growing fleet despite our growing problem of U.S. Navy numbers:
US forces used ATACMS to sink Iranian warships during Operation Epic Fury, the top US general said.
This applies to the Marines as well. Both the Army and Marines have used missiles and rockets to assist in the anti-ship mission in the current war. I raised this capability for coping with China in this essay:
It sure looks like there will be a joint Army-Marine expeditionary force sent to Taiwan if China invades. Sometimes separate things that don’t make sense can become reasonable when pieced together.
I described how those Army and Marine ground units with anti-ship weapons could help fight the Chinese navy if China tries to invade Taiwan. And I noted the big mission such units cannot accomplish.
COMBINED AND JOINT WARFARE DON’T USE SILVER BULLETS
So there are already lessons from air, ground, and naval operations for combined and joint operations that are relevant to other potential wars.
I’m sure more examples are and will be evident before this surge of American and Israeli military action is concluded—whether it ends the long war with Iran’s mullah regime or simply represents an Iranian defeat in one campaign in a war that will continue as long as the mullahs rule.
NOTE: Image from this site.
Well, other than sitting and taking it. But as Iran demonstrated in the Iran-Iraq War, even their fanaticism can take enough of a beating to finally break.
And at some level I worry the Iranians might try to attack west through Iraq and turn south to make a dramatic attack into Kuwait. Even if it fails spectacularly it might be enough of a shock to collapse our—or our allies—determination to keep fighting.