Conventional Air Power as a Counter-UAV Asset

Joint warfare beats silver bullet pretenders

I observed regarding the Iran War of 2026 that we are ignoring the power of conventional air power to disable enemy drone attacks while we curse our failure to pay attention to Ukrainian air defense skills in the face of Russian drone and missile attacks.

Despite the criticism that America isn’t learning lessons from Ukraine’s air defense effort against Russia’s aerial onslaught, I urged a little perspective:

Observations that America and Western countries haven’t learned enough from Ukraine’s drone defense equipment and strategy to cope with Iran have a point. To an extent.

Consider that learning from Ukraine means being better at the “right of launch” mission of shooting down enemy suicide drones. America and our allies deployed some, but absolutely could have used more of that capability.

But America and Israel have broader capabilities with our old-style air forces and missile power. These have excelled at “left of launch” where we shoot the archers and not the arrows. Iranian suicide drone attacks have dropped dramatically.

No doubt Ukraine could use more of that capability.

Consider¹ what Ukraine has achieved against Russia’s aerial campaign that relies on Iran-supplied designs for suicide drones:

Ukraine is certainly mostly resisting Russia’s missile barrage:

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; 13 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh oblasts; and 14 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 480 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones – of which about 290 were Shahed drones – from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 453 drones, eight Iskander-M/S-400 missiles, and 11 Kalibr missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 26 drones struck 22 locations; that drone debris fell at five locations; and that Ukrainian authorities were clarifying information about one missile as of 0900 local time.

Although more are getting through, it seems, as time goes on. Nine Russian missiles and 26 drones got through that night. Ukraine has not managed to greatly affect Russia’s ability to launch drones and missiles.

Then let’s look at Iran’s aerial campaign against the UAE, which Iran is focusing on:

This is the result of one wave of incoming Iranian missiles and drones targeting the UAE on March 10th:

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) said Tuesday its air defenses detected nine ballistic missiles and 35 drones launched by Iran. Eight missiles were intercepted while one fell into the sea.

Of the 35 drones, 26 were shot down and nine crashed on UAE soil, the country said.

No missiles struck targets and nine drones hit UAE territory (whether they hit targets is not stated).

Allied air defenses are certainly inferior to what Ukraine has fielded. And we realize it:

Cheap Iranian drone attacks are forcing the Pentagon to rapidly expand layered air defenses in the Middle East, as thousands of U.S. troops stationed across the region face an escalating aerial threat that is testing the limits of traditional missile defenses.

But American and Israeli offensive systems in their two very capable air forces (including the Navy’s afloat air force) have seemingly managed to greatly reduce Iran’s ability to launch missiles and cheap drones and therefore with even weaker air defenses protect territory with more effectiveness than Ukraine’s mostly air defense effort.

This in no way means I think we should not try to emulate Ukraine’s drone defense capabilities:

Recall, too, that in 2018 in Army magazine I called for Army fighter drones to deal with the growing threat of small drone swarms. I’m not somebody who has simply denied small drones are a new threat.

But this is not a one-dimensional issue of developing cheap counter-drone systems to defeat cheap suicide attack drones.

Face it, the so-called obsolete traditional air forces bring capabilities to a war that no number of cheap small suicide drones can provide:

But don’t shift your victory through air power theory shifted temporarily to Big Air Power back to cheap suicide drones based on the Iran War of 2026.

Keep thinking joint warfare with varied capabilities complementing each other. As I noted about last year’s air war against Iran:

Really, neither Russia nor Ukraine have been able to exploit Big Air Force capabilities to counter drones the way Israel did. Both sides sit and take it, coping (or not coping) as best they can with passive defenses and air defense weapons.

What could NATO’s Big Air Force do to reduce the massed droned attacks at the source in ways neither side manages in the Winter War of 2022?

Normally, conventional air forces would bomb enemy rear areas to degrade logistics, artillery support, reserve maneuver units, aircraft on the ground, ships in port, command and control, and facilities and infrastructure (including air fields).

Why wouldn’t conventional air forces focus on that scope of targets to include enemy drone launching sites, logistics, factories, and personnel? Using F-35s to shoot down cheap drones rather than focus on this part of the counter-drone campaign is insane.

We seem to be doing exactly this in the current air campaign against Iran.

Whether we can exploit this success is another question. And much depends on what victory option we believe is attainable.

By all means, improve on our deficiencies against cheap suicide drones revealed in this war. But don’t ignore what Big Air Force is achieving.

NOTE: I made the image with the Substack capability.

1. This is just a snapshot based on the information available when I drafted this.