Do Taiwanese Want to Defend Their Democracy?
Can allies help with this issue?
Maybe finding the right super weapon for Taiwan isn't the way to defend tiny Taiwan against huge China's demand that Taiwan submit to the mainland and give up their dangerous democracy and liberty.
I have reassessed my perspective on U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan. My initial belief was that the U.S. should prioritize strengthening Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, primarily by transforming it into a “porcupine” through increased arms sales and constructing an anti-hegemonic coalition in the region. While I continue to support these objectives, my visit has revealed that military support alone is insufficient. A comprehensive strategy must also include a robust soft power component aimed at fostering political unity, morale, and military readiness in Taiwan.
I also worry weapons are the least of Taiwan's problems:
I'm very worried about Taiwanese resolve to fight hard if China invades. And I see a recent CRS summary states:
Civil defense preparedness is insufficient, according to some observers, and Taiwan’s military struggles to recruit, retain, and train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear what costs—in terms of economic security, well-being, safety and security, and lives—Taiwan’s people would be willing or able to bear in the face of possible PRC armed aggression.
And if the Taiwanese lack the will to fight or even to spend to prepare to fight, some Taiwanese may go to Plan B to survive the conquest. This is something that keeps me awake at night.
[If China invades Taiwan, it will] "rely on treason within Taiwan’s astonishingly lackadaisical armed forces to win quickly."
And winning quickly may only require getting ashore intact and defying efforts to eject the PLA. I don't think that the Taiwanese are island Israelis. Or even Ukrainians.
Sometimes I read analysts whose advocacy of an insurgency to deter China relies on a willingness to fight and die that other analysts don't support with their description of poorly trained reservists and seemingly defeatist attitudes in general. Although perhaps a successful Ukrainian defense will bolster Taiwanese morale by thinking that if Ukraine can win, Taiwan can do just as well with their 100-mile wide water-filled anti-tank ditch.
But if so, it’s not apparent yet:
Despite slight improvements to conscription, and the integration of high technology sensors and naval platforms primarily focused on deterring China before they seize control of a beachhead, Taipei has thus far demonstrated less urgency to prepare for a large war than Kyiv. It is therefore just as important that the Western allies of Taiwan at least formulate a theoretical framework to anticipate the possibility of a decidedly disastrous shock.
That is, do new weapons disguise the possibility of a sudden collapse of Taiwan’s military if it is hit hard enough and the subsequent evaporation of civilian resistance?
In regard to the weapons issue, in large part I worry because much of the push to arm up Taiwan seems to consist of the argument that Taiwan needs the latest fad silver bullet weapon. The Church of Asymmetry has added the tail fins of sea and air suicide drones to their body of work. But it was once anti-ship missiles on small boats in the Taiwan Strait.
The terminology changes but the idea remains the same that one neat trick can save Taiwan at a fraction of the cost of normal defense!
In fact, "Asymmetrical" concepts seem to miss the point that any weapon system or type of military unit has weaknesses that another weapon or type of unit must cover. That's why we embrace combined arms within the ground services and jointness between the services. It's rock, paper, scissors.
When I hear about asymmetric defenses, it almost always means that someone thinks that a country can escape the burden of defense spending by some clever device that undermines the enemy's entire expensive arsenal. Just because a country decides to use weapons other than carriers to fight carriers or weapons other than tanks to fight tanks doesn't make them asymmetric. It makes it war.
God forbid Taiwan should have any weapons like frigates and submarines to resist a Chinese blockade off the east coast:
Taiwan's older but larger sea-control ships have a role east of Taiwan to keep open their sea lines of communication to the outside world. In the strait itself, Taiwan needs small boats, submarines, and shore-based missiles, artillery, and aircraft to fight the Chinese sea-control forces trying to open the way for an invasion of Taiwan.
And God forbid Taiwan should field sufficient tanks and artillery to drive the PLA into the sea:
America, Taiwan and any other partners willing to enter the fray would need to concentrate on stopping the invasion, putting every available hindrance in the way of China’s armada and aircraft. Think sea mines and anti-ship and anti-air missiles launched from various platforms on land, at sea and in the air. The defenders would also need to eliminate or eject any Chinese forces that managed to land. [emphasis added]
The public recognition of the need to eliminate the PLA bridgeheads (and air heads) is a new thing, as a Forbes article about a U.S. Army role to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan highlighted:
As Brian J. Dunn observed in a seminal assessment for Military Review last year, "To defeat Taiwan and avoid war with America, all China needs to do is get ashore in force and impose a cease-fire prior to significant American intervention."
The link in the quote goes to my Military Review article where I explored that issue. I go into it a bit more in this post.
Those "asymmetric" weapons—which in many cases seems to just be a misconception of "combined arms" warfare—certainly helped blunt Russia's invasion. But Ukraine needed the legacy weapons in the places Ukraine drove the Russians back. A new weapon doesn't need to be the silver bullet to be useful. There's too much panty flinging going on.
Anyway, I went into that issue of driving the PLA into the sea in that Military Review article linked in the preceding quote. Interestingly enough, publication was delayed for an additional security review. I don't know what article or articles prompted that. I suspect it was simply the subject matter given the diplomatic dance America taps out in regard to the defense and status of Taiwan.
But I digress.
So I guess the initial author has a little more reassessment to do on this aspect of the issue, if I'm right on the strategy issue that calls for the weapons that are supposedly a waste.
And that soft power component can be broader. What will bolster morale that the two authors I cite raise? I disagree on the unity thing if it means suppressing freedom. The "unity" should be patriotism that is proud of the progress and democracy Taiwan has built. Contrast that with the bargain with the Devil the mainland Chinese made to get progress in exchange for accepting lack of freedom and democracy. And the fact that China got less progress, too, in that bargain, shows the bargain wasn't necessary for progress. It was necessary for the monopoly on power that the Chinese Communist Party will pay any price to maintain.
In the short run Taiwan needs to arm up despite the odds. I think there are limits to how much China can exploit its superior size to invade Taiwan. But maybe the ultimate defense of Taiwan isn't tanks and legacy weapons to drive the PLA into the sea. Or the search for the Holy Grail of weapons to smash a Chinese invasion. Or better troop morale to help Taiwan resist every stage of a Chinese invasion. Or long-range cruise missiles to drop China's Three Gorges Dam. Or even nukes. As that initial author writes:
In addition to its historical legitimacy, Taiwan represents a compelling alternative to the CCP’s vision of modern Chinese society. While the CCP’s social contract promises material prosperity in exchange for political control and the curtailing of civil liberties, Taiwan offers a different model—one where democracy, freedom of speech, and economic growth coexist.
Positioning Taiwan as the example of modern Chinese success allows the U.S. to present a powerful counter-narrative to the CCP’s authoritarianism. By highlighting Taiwan’s technological advancements, democratic governance, and robust civil society, we can promote Taiwan as the model for the Chinese-speaking world.
Maybe making Taiwan's democracy an example for mainland Chinese is the ultimate weapon. Maybe the last resort is the best resort to defend Taiwan.
NOTE: I generated the illustration with the Substack system.