Israel Returns to the Hezbollah Problem

Israel sent their army into Lebanon. How far north should it go?

Israel is edging toward an invasion of Lebanon to make a serious attempt to destroy Hezbollah. The effects of the aerial pounding that decimated and suppressed Hezbollah have worn off. I’ve long held a deep multi-division ground raid into Lebanon is required.

That Israel has resumed ground combat operations in Lebanon calls into question their victory through air power theory about defeating Hezbollah. It also raises the issue of whether Israel believes the American-Israeli strike campaign against Iran can set the conditions for the overthrow or collapse of the mullah-run Iranian regime.

Israel is now maintaining ground troop positions inside Lebanon:

The IDF has continued to conduct ground operations in southern Lebanon.

But it was a shallow presence to call in fires on identified targets. The map at the top indicates those positions. One could also say that the Israeli troops just inside Lebanon hold cleared entry points for other troops to pass through and head north.

In that light, this is interesting:

Israeli and US officials told Axios on March 13 that Israel is planning to “significantly expand” its ground campaign in Lebanon to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure south of the Litani River. A senior Israeli official said that Israel’s objectives are to “take over territory, push Hezbollah’s forces north and away from the border, and dismantle [Hezbollah’s] military positions and weapons depots in [southern Lebanese] villages.”

Note that the Litani River is the apparent limit of the most ambitious ground option considered:

Israeli officials are reportedly discussing the potential expansion of Israeli ground operations in Lebanon. Israeli media reported that Israeli security and defense officials are examining several options, ranging from an expansive ground operation reaching the Litani River to more limited actions in southern Lebanon.

And following that expression of intent, seemingly limited operations began:

The IDF announced the start of a targeted ground operation in southern Lebanon on March 16. The IDF reported on March 16 that the IDF 91st Division begun a targeted ground operation targeting key locations in southern Lebanon in order to solidify ”the forward defense zone,” destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, and kill Hezbollah fighters.

Yet it was just a single Israeli division in combat. Although I did hear that two more divisions will be part of the operation.

Yet the mission was still framed as limited in scope:

The offensive is intended to “remove threats and create an additional layer of security for residents of northern Israel,” the [Israeli] spokesperson said.

Israel’s successful air campaign (including the spectacular Beeper Attack on Hezbollah leadership) momentarily shook my conviction that Israel could not defeat Hezbollah without a major ground operation:

Unless a future victory through air power advocate can replicate Israel’s unique factors for success, a future campaign no matter how precise will fail and need to call on ground troops to put boots on the enemy targets.

Still, I was unwilling to make this a general lesson for other situations. And information quickly arrived that led me to claw back my admission of error (from an update to the essay quoted above about what Israel could do in Gaza):

That would tend to make my original judgment correct about the firepower strategy based on Israel’s 2006 war. And it may mean that I was premature to say the recent war against Hezbollah has been an exception to my critique. We may simply not see the failure yet in Lebanon.

It took a while to see the long-term failure in the recent campaign. Israel certainly knocked Hezbollah down. The Beeper Attack was spectacular. But the threat was not ended. Hezbollah was free to repair its capabilities and restore its morale after the shock and awe. This is a problem with mowing the grass and could apply to Iran if the maximalist objective is not achieved.

Yet the apparent scope of Israeli ground operations is quite limited—to destroy Hezbollah’s short-range bombardment capabilities and direct-fire attacks across the Israel-Lebanon border. The Litani River is south of where Israel has been striking dangerous Hezbollah assets; and north of where Israel is now operating across the border. Which indicates to me that even cleaning out Lebanon south of the Litani River won’t be enough.

Again, this border activity could be a mission for expanding bridgeheads inside Lebanon to allow a couple more Israeli divisions to get a running start into Lebanon.

You make ask, where is the United Nations force in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) to prevent Hezbollah from attacking Israel? UNI … LOL!

You scoff at the idea that the international community will stop Hizbollah? You simpleton!

The international community must be angry with Hizbollah. I mean, the UN didn't authorize Hizbollah to attack Israel. So there was no international test, right? Hizbollah launched an illegal war, right?

Given the history and capabilities of the UN, I suggest the new UN force in Lebanon be called UNIFAIL. Or possibly UNIFUTILE.

Or am I being too cynical?

That was a 2006 post. I was not being too cynical.

And note we don’t even bother asking if the weak Lebanese government could do the job notwithstanding the hopes that Israel’s aerial campaign could weaken Hezbollah enough to enable the Lebanese security forces to disarm and relocate Hezbollah away from southern Lebanon.

But enough of my contempt for the willingness of the Sainted International Community® to actually solve the Hezbollah problem.

My view has long been that with Hezbollah entrenched in positions further north that a drive into the Bekaa Valley is needed to rip up Hezbollah’s soft rear area to make it harder for Hezbollah to rebuild its frontline positions south of the Litani River:¹

The next time there is a war with Hezbollah, Israel will fight it way differently, I think:

I assume that any war will be a multi-division push north of the Litani that will take advantage of the fact that Hezbollah, after 2006, wrongly believes it can go toe-to-toe with Israeli troops and so will fight as light infantry rather than as insurgents. For a while, Israel will be able to really pound Hizbollah ground forces as the Israelis take over rocket-launch sites and armories with troops.

Further, I’d guess the Israelis will push rapidly into the Bekaa Valley as far as Baalbek to tear up Hezbollah’s rear area to slow down rearmament after the war is over. Air strikes would take place north of that, if necessary, I’d guess.

Regardless of how deep inside Lebanon the Israeli army operates, at some point it will recoil to a flattened buffer zone inside Lebanon along the border with Israel. But that does nothing to stop longer range Hezbollah weapons.

We shall see if Israel goes far north of the map by continuing along the road beyond Zahle to reach Baalbek.² But I’m reasonably sure that if Israel’s ground operation is limited to south of the Litani River, the Israelis are ultimately counting on Iran being friendly or—if still hostile—too weakened to rebuild Hezbollah again and sustain it.

Yet here we are with Hezbollah risking much by firing at Israel as part of Iran’s “fight Israel to the last dead Arab” policy.

1. I’ve been writing about this so long that I migrated for reasons unknown to me from “Hizbollah” to “Hezbollah”.

2. And we will see if Hezbollah still believes it can fight the Israeli military with conventional ground combat tactics.