Killing the Rain
Israel's aerial defanging of Hezbollah's rocket bite
Israel did what I thought was impossible: destroying from the air Hezbollah’s ability to surge rockets at Israeli civilians in a volume that would overwhelm its Iron Dome anti-rocket system. Initially designed to protect military installations by only intercepting rockets calculated to hit military targets, public pressure pushed it into a broader and more difficult role of protecting civilians. Why was I wrong?
The Israeli success is undeniable:
The death of Hezbollah’s feared leader, who for decades commanded a Lebanese militia in its fight against the Israeli state, was the culmination of a two-week offensive. The campaign combined covert technological wizardry with brute military force, including remotely detonating explosives hidden in thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah, as well as a withering aerial bombardment with the aim of destroying thousands of missiles and rockets capable of hitting Israel.
It was also the result of two decades of methodical intelligence work in preparation for an all-out war that many expected would eventually come.
Strategypage looks at what Israel did:
In one day Israel carried out airstrikes that hit over 1,600 targets in southern Lebanon. In the past year Hezbollah had fired about 8,000 rockets and missiles into Israel. After the September air strikes, the number of Hezbollah rockets fired into Israel fell to a few random rockets launched every few days. Israeli air defenses destroy nearly all these rockets and missiles.
And what Israel didn’t do to achieve that result:
The Israeli air strikes against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon were the most intensive in modern warfare. The attacks did a lot of property damage to Lebanon but killed far fewer civilians than a bombardment campaign of that magnitude was expected.
That’s despite Hezbollah’s violation of the rules of war by placing its military assets in and near civilian targets.
Going back to the 2006 war, I believed Israel screwed the pooch by trying to rely on air power to stop Hezbollah’s rocket barrage. As that failed, Israel launched a weak and shallow ground drive that never had a chance of putting boots on Hezbollah’s launch sites.
Israel’s failure again reinforced my skepticism of air power-only strategies that was revealed by the 1990s NATO air campaigns over the former Yugoslavia.
I figured the logical response to the 2006 failure for the next war would be to drive deep into Lebanon to rip apart Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal and rear area administrative infrastructure:
I assume that any war will be a multi-division push north of the Litani that will take advantage of the fact that Hezbollah, after 2006, wrongly believes it can go toe-to-toe with Israeli troops and so will fight as light infantry rather than as insurgents. For a while, Israel will be able to really pound Hizbollah ground forces as the Israelis take over rocket-launch sites and armories with troops.
Further, I'd guess the Israelis will push rapidly into the Bekaa Valley as far as Baalbek to tear up Hezbollah's rear area to slow down rearmament after the war is over. Air strikes would take place north of that, if necessary, I'd guess.
Indeed, Israeli preparations for urban warfare seemed to reinforce my view.
One basic reason for this focus is that I long assumed Israel’s Iron Dome system could not outlast the vastly expanded Hezbollah rocket and missile arsenal. Because the shield could only last a finite amount of time and because I didn’t think air power could work quickly enough, Israel would need to use the sword of ground power to take the launch sites. This would have the added advantage of setting Hezbollah back a long time. Much longer than simply restocking the rocket supply would require.
Ah yes, Israel considers it great progress to be able to screw the pooch in 24 hours when once it took two weeks during the 2006 war with Hezbollah. And the defense chief wants to what? Cut it to 12 hours? Have two services contribute to the 24-hour objective?
I was horrified that the Israelis were aiming to destroy in 24 hours what they had previously taken three days to destroy, rather than figuring out how to occupy the rocket- and missile-launching sites with their own troops as rapidly as possible--with the air and missile support needed to do it quickly.
And it is horrifying that the Israelis may think that punishing the rest of Lebanon for what the Iranian-backed Hezbollah does outside of weak central government authority isn't counter-productive. How did that work out in 2006, anyway?
But Israel’s fires approach worked! How?
First, Hezbollah kept their firing a relative trickle rather than surging their fire volume.
Part of this may be the lack of having the initiative. Getting caught flat footed by the Hamas murder and rape invasion on October 7, 2023 prevented Hezbollah from preparing a big surge attack that would overwhelm Iron Dome before Israel could react. But part seemed to be an unwillingness of Hezbollah to tie themselves to a war with Israel that Hezbollah apparently had no say in starting. Getting bled white fighting on Iran’s orders to save Assad was also likely a bucket of cold water thrown on Hezbollah enthusiasm.
Second, Israel evacuated its civilians from the border areas.
Third, for a long time Israel’s response did not escalate to levels that seemed dangerous to Hezbollah. Hezbollah maintained the ability to trickle in the rockets and kept much of their rocket stockpile.
Four, Israeli intelligence clearly used the time since 2006 to gain clarity on Hezbollah’s capabilities inside Lebanon.
Five, eventually Israel used its intelligence campaign to cripple Hezbollah with their pager and walkie talkie bombs that targeted key Hezbollah personnel without much harm to Lebanese civilians.
Six, after the cumulative effects of a long campaign, Israel was able to complete the final two-week campaign with an aerial fires blitz that finished the job against Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal capable of hitting Israel.
Seven, this bit from the initial NYT article about Nasrallah’s assessment of the fight he was waging is interesting:
In his view, Israel had no interest in a full-scale war.
By inference, Nasrallah also had no interest in a full-scale war against Israel. His effort alongside Hamas always seemed like Solidarity Theater designed to avoid blame for not helping Hamas or abandoning Palestinians. But without risking heavy losses. And thinking Israel would also restrain itself justified Nasrallah’s belief that he did not need to use or lose his massive rocket and missile arsenal built up since 2006 at huge cost.
Israel’s intelligence, planning, precision weapons, and skillful execution were certainly vital differences from the 2006 failure. But Israel waged serious war while Hezbollah staged a performance of Solidarity Theater. Nasrallah’s view of the conflict compared to Israel’s was the key difference that allowed Israel to win.
But consider too that Israel requires boots on the ground to defend the mostly aerial victory. Israel actually did send troops into Lebanon in a shallow operation during the air campaign. And before it pulls out, Israel is counting on the Lebanese army and the United Nations to fill the void. Maybe the Lebanese army can be effective against a weakened Hezbollah. And maybe the U.N.’s see no evil/speak no evil UNIFIL peacekeeping force will no longer be the Hezbollah-friendly UNIFAIL.
Unless a future victory through air power advocate can replicate Israel’s unique factors for success, a future campaign no matter how precise will fail and need to call on ground troops to put boots on the enemy targets.
UPDATE (22 JAN 25): This assessment by a man who teaches military doctrine at the IDF’s National Defense College says that Israel didn't and can't win the war against Hamas—if winning is defined as destroying Hamas (tip to Instapundit):
Baratz notes that the army’s rank-and-file is second to none, but the General Staff’s lack of strategy results in endless targeted raids, where the IDF goes in, kills some terrorists, retreats, then reenters the same area to cope with more terrorists—and lose more of its valiant young soldiers.
“When generals don’t have a strategy, they come up with an overarching strategy of attrition, which doctrinally, is achieved by raids,” Baratz told JNS on Jan. 15.
“They have different names for raids. In Vietnam, it was called ‘search and destroy.’ But it was the same idea. You raid a place, you kill the enemy combatants, with some collateral damage, and you pull back. You could see that in the Second Lebanon War [in 2006], and you can see that today.
That would tend to make my original judgment correct about the firepower strategy based on Israel’s 2006 war. And it may mean that I was premature to say the recent war against Hezbollah has been an exception to my critique. We may simply not see the failure yet in Lebanon.
NOTE: I created the image with Bing.