Objective: Taiwan

Classics Saturday

Photo by Ethan Lin on Unsplash

Taiwan has a mini-series about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan:

In the wake of a new Taiwanese election, the Chinese People’s Liberation Navy and Air Force surround the island of Taiwan and cut off access to the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s stock market crumbles and banks fail. Hackers, infiltrators and Chinese sympathizers wreak havoc on Taiwan’s infrastructure. Foreigners and citizens begin to flee as water, electricity and communications are cut across the island nation. Everything happens over the course of a single week, and everyone knows what’s coming: a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

This is the nightmare scenario imagined by the new 10-part Taiwanese television series “Zero Day.” The show’s 17-minute trailer, released on July 23, 2024, racked up 1.5 million views in just two weeks, which aren’t Marvel-level numbers but is still impressive, given the timeframe. The trailer has left many viewers in Taiwan understandably shaken.

I have my own view on how it could unfold. And I seriously worry about how brittle Taiwanese morale will be if China makes it ashore. Let’s look at my views on China’s intentions, an example from history on how to invade without the ability to recreate the 1944 Normandy Invasion, and how China might carry it out. These three posts from early in my blogging are still valid, I believe.

I have more recent thoughts in Military Review that Forbes said included a seminal assessment about how to ultimately win such a war that I’ll link at the end.

It took me so long to complete this series that I forgot the title I started with. Oops. To be fair, I started on Yahoo!Geocities.

/BEGIN TRILOGY/

Thursday, November 27, 2003

The Taiwan Showdown—Part I (Intentions)

The Chinese are psyching themselves up for the showdown with us over Taiwan. A recently passed Taiwanese bill that at one time seemed to threaten a public referendum on a formal declaration of independence upsets China:

Pro-independence activists have campaigned for 10 years for a referendum law. The movement has gained wide public support ahead of presidential elections on March 20, 2004, when the question of Taiwan's sovereignty is expected to take center stage.

President Chen has enraged China by aggressively asserting his island is a separate country -- making that and a referendum on a new constitution the key pillars of his campaign for re-election on March 20, 2004.

The Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College has an excellent paper on deterring a war over Taiwan (“Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait” Douglas McCready, November 2003). I’ll not cite specific points, but much of this post will draw on this paper. Much of it reinforces information I’ve read elsewhere or opinions I have formed already. In some cases, I disagree with the conclusions reached on specific points. It is an excellent one-stop shopping point for this post.

I believe America will fight to stop China from taking over Taiwan. The US has a legal commitment to defending Taiwan; a moral obligation to defend a democracy against a dictatorship; and a strategic goal of preventing allies from peeling away if they see us retreat in the face of Chinese power, and thus losing influence in the area. Plus, we have a general interest in keeping the area quiet for trade and prosperity reasons. Indeed although we say that we want this resolved without use of force, McCready notes that even a peaceful union of Taiwan under Chinese rule would be unacceptable to America.

One problem is that the Chinese don’t think we will fight for Taiwan. They think their interests are so much greater than ours that they will out-suffer us if necessary to win.

A related problem with our perceptions is that we try to impress upon our enemies our power by letting them see our military up close in training. The idea is that potential foes will come away with a “holy freaking crap” moment and impress upon their countrymen that there is no way they can beat America. This is a major error on our part, especially with the Chinese. Why? Because the Chinese are already terribly impressed with our technology and military skills after seeing the Persian Gulf War, Kosovo War, and Iraq War from a distance. We know this. So there is no reason to let them see us up close and see our weaknesses. We don’t want them to see our weaknesses because the Chinese know they are inferior, yet are absolutely convinced that we will not accept even light casualties in a war. The Chinese believe this is our crucial weakness. They are wrong, but they will act on this belief. Their belief that they can create niche capabilities that will nullify our overall superiority is strengthened by our policy of showing them our stuff. Shut this down! Now.

Perhaps most important, I don’t think we appreciate that China regards taking over Taiwan as the only thing that matters to them. It is central to their very legitimacy as a government. Indeed, the Chinese think the fact that we don’t appreciate this is our most dangerous misperception. We are too numbed to the threat after numerous saber rattling by China and 50 years of stability despite the saber rattling. Also, the Chinese know that taking Taiwan will push us out of the Western Pacific and East Asia as an effective power able to counter China. Indeed, even if showing China our military power up close could tell them anything useful to us that they can’t see from afar, this would not be enough. McCready notes that Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated that they would go to war rather than allow Taiwan become independent. And they’d go to war whether they thought they’d lose or not. The belief by some over here that “everyone” would lose in a war over Taiwan is just silly. We have no idea what China considers losing on this issue.

And the crisis in 1996 when China fired missiles around Taiwan and we sent two carrier battle groups to the area showed China that we would respond to intimidation tactics. Have the Chinese learned that only a preemptive offensive that quickly conquers China will give them Taiwan? Will they try to win clearly before America can effectively respond?

One problem we have with our assessments of what China could do militarily is that we mirror image them. McCready notes this but does not draw the right conclusion in my mind. He says, “Because different viewers evaluate capabilities differently, what we see as capabilities do not necessarily limit our adversary’s intentions.” He then says, “Thus, having decided not to pursue the cross-Strait amphibious invasion option, the PRC is not investing heavily in amphibious assault craft or associated weapons. Instead, China has chosen to concentrate resources on weapons that will permit it to intimidate Taiwan and deter U. S. intervention.” We look at the geography and add China’s deficiencies in air power and sea lift and say the Chinese wouldn’t dare try it. You think we’d know better, since in 1950, we concluded that China was incapable of intervening in Korea with enough power to be successful. We thought that it was obviously irrational to fight us and so assumed China would not.

As I’ve written repeatedly, the Chinese desire for Taiwan trumps all other considerations. We are in a very dangerous period and I think the period right before the Olympics in ’08 will be a window for a Chinese invasion. Some cite what McCready correctly calls the cliché of Asian patience to support their belief that China will never invade Taiwan. Patience does not mean you never act. It means you act at a time and place and methods of your choosing, timed to give you maximum chances for victory.

And remember, as McCready noted, “China has said that if using force becomes necessary, it intends to defeat Taiwan before the United States can intervene effectively.” Just as ominously, he cites the fact that “Chinese military history demonstrates readiness to use preemptive strikes, especially against more powerful foes.”

Thursday, January 01, 2004

The Taiwan Showdown—Part II (Invasion Without a Navy)

Sources used include this 1997 Air Command and Staff College research paper by Major Brian T. Baxley (here's a source that works); and Norway 1940 website (here's a backup).

Invasion Problem
This is the basic problem. You are a major land power with plenty of troops and aircraft and you wish to conquer a far smaller country. While the status quo is acceptable, a change for the worse is not. The problem is you have to cross quite a bit of sea to get to the target and you have little amphibious warfare capability. To add to your misery, a major power with a powerful navy that includes aircraft carriers, possibly supported by another major power, may intervene to stop you.

This is China's problem today. They may need to invade Taiwan but the United States and maybe Japan stand in the way. But it was also Germany's problem in the spring of 1940. As long as Norway was neutral, Germany could import critical iron ore and remain free from attack from enemy bases in Norway. Germany had to contemplate British and French resistance to their plans or even preemptive action. Yet Germany pulled off the invasion and Norway remained under German control for the remainder of the war.

So how did Germany do it?

Norwegian defenders
The Norwegians had 12,000 troops on active duty in 6 infantry brigades, three cavalry regiments, and separate units. Reserves were 120,000 strong. The brigades were poorly equipped and lacked mobility. The Norwegians had little artillery or anti-aircraft weapons. They had an old and small navy, dispersed across Norway’s long coast. The Norwegians had only about 40 old combat aircraft. In addition, neutral Denmark was in the way.

German invasion force
The Germans had six infantry division and a parachute battalion allocated to conquer Norway. The German navy was modern and of good quality, but had few ships. Thirty warships were available but Germany had no amphibious ships to carry troops.

The Germans had 500 transport aircraft each capable of carrying 28 troops. They also had 100 fighters and 330 bombers for the invasion.

Allied expectations
The British only expected a small German effort if they went after Norway. The British based their plans on the Germans being able to invade with no more than eight battalions. The British had a large navy with aircraft carriers, although the carrier aircraft were not equal to the German aircraft nor could the British carriers hold many planes. Still, German bases were far to the south of Norway. The Norwegians expected the British to help them.

German invasion plan
For ground forces, Germany was able to deploy 50 battalions of troops. The British wrongly assumed only 6-8 battalions could be landed. The Germans exceeded the worst-case British estimate by a factor of six. How did the Germans do this?

The Germans sent ships to sea six days before the invasion date in order to attack widely separated targets simultaneously. The Germans deployed a parachute battalion and about 9,000 infantry carried aboard warships in six groups for the initial landings at different points in Norway (Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Arendal, Oslo, and Egersand). Another 1,400 were dedicated to an assault on Denmark, which would provide convenient stepping stones to Norway. Two battlecruisers were the primary heavy naval force to escort the invasion elements in the northernmost thrust.

The Germans disguised transport ships as civilian cargo ships to carry the second wave. These ships made repeated trips. A half dozen submarines were outfitted to carry supplies. German bombers were held in reserve to attack any British navy forces found by recon aircraft over the North Sea.

The invasion
On April 9, 1940, German forces began their invasion of Norway. The Norwegian navy just watched the Germans go by, unwilling to initiate hostilities. The British lacked enough recon aircraft to track the German fleet.

Two airborne landings were made at Stavenger and Oslo, supported by German airpower. German air transports then airlifted 6 battalions into Oslo and 2 more into Stavenger to reinforce. At Bergen, 3 seaplanes brought in troops. Air power helped the German warships enter the harbors for the first wave. Initial objectives were captured quickly and they began to fan out to the rest of the country. The Norwegian navy did interfere with water lines of supply but Germans relied on air transports for resupply. The Germans quickly put captured airfields into use for their own aircraft to support the troops and fight off any British naval intervention.

In the middle of April, small British and French forces landed in Norway to resist the German invasion. Four British brigades, 3 French demi-brigades, and a Polish brigade (plus supporting units) were sent to Norway to oppose the Germans. The British deployed a few dozen fighters to Norway but were unable to prevent the Germans from gaining air superiority. German air power kept British navy in northern Norwegian waters. The Germans were successful in pushing back the allies everywhere but at Narvik in the north, which the allies captured after fatal hesitation on May 28. Ten German destroyers in Narvik harbor were sunk by two British forays into the harbor.

With the Germans crushing French and British resistance in France, the allies withdrew from their isolated Narvik toehold by June 9. The Germans managed to sink one of the British carriers in the final phase, 260 miles west of Norway.

End state
The Germans overwhelmed the Norwegian and Allied forces that tried to hold Norway. In the short run, the German surface fleet was crippled. Both battlecruisers were damaged and out of action for six months. But the occupation of Norway allowed the Germans to secure their iron ore imports from Sweden, protect their northern flank and prevent Allied attacks from that direction, and provided bases to send out ships, submarines, and planes to strike British naval forces. When Allied convoys passed by Norwegian waters to supply the Soviet Union later in the war, German bases here allowed the Germans to savage the vital supply lines.

As one author of the campaign stated (quoted in Baxley’s paper):

The occupation of Norway was a great military success for Germany. In the face of British naval superiority, the landing operation could only succeed if the intention remained concealed long enough to make allied counter-measures late and therefore ineffective. This was achieved. The Allies’ delay, and their failure to act immediately on receipt of the first news of the German invasion, were contributory causes to the German success.

It was an impressive performance for a country with a small navy and a non-existent amphibious warfare force.

Monday, April 11, 2005

The Taiwan Crisis: Part III

OK, this is my long-delayed Part III on China's intentions to invade Taiwan. This focuses on a scenario for invasion. It is speculation based on reading numerous articles and posts over the last few years layered on to my assumptions about what the Chinese would need to do based on their military strengths and weaknesses.

[Links to parts I and II deleted]

Assumptions
So, on the assumption that China will invade on the eve of the 2008 summer Olympics in Peking, how will they do it?

May to July is a non-monsoon window for the Taiwan Strait region (the other is October) and so would fit very nicely with the assumed pre-Olympics timing. [Correction: See here for corrected typhoon seasons in the area]

I also assume that the Chinese want the war over fast. I'm not sure whether our threat to stop buying cheap toys and clothing from China is more of a threat to Peking than their threat to dump treasury bonds and dollars is to us, but with the uncertainties of economics to the certainty that we'd cut off oil imports and the certainty that we could hammer the People's Liberation Army if we gear up for war just as we did in Korea, the Chinese want the war over fast. Plus, as one reader noted, if there is an economic panic prior to a war, the whole question of whether economic dislocations will harm America or China will be moot. Nor would a foreign (you know what I mean) adventure be an alien solution to a domestic problem. Generally, a long war invites complications and more chances for unplanned events to intrude on their plans. The threat of nuclear war argues for a fast war, too.

I further assume that the Chinese want to keep this a localized conflict so they won't open with a Pearl Harbor-style attack on our forces at Guam, Okinawa, or any other US bases in Japan. They may not even be capable of seriously hitting bases successfully so far away. An ineffective attack would be counter-productive. Why bother emphasizing the internal nature of the conflict if you are going to internationalize the crisis by attacking other nations? When the war needs to be won quickly before the US and Japan intervene, why make it easier for America and Japan to intervene by essentially deciding for us? Why give the UN cause to get involved? Absent direct inter-state conflict, our response could be delayed critical days or weeks.

So the plan will be a direct and fast assault on Taiwan to win before any outside power can save Taiwan from conquest. The Chinese will have four main missions for their military in an invasion: One, landing nine army divisions and one Marine division on Taiwanese territory plus dropping three parachute divisions and one air landing division. Two, securing the sea and air lines of supply and reinforcement from China to Taiwan. Three, keeping American forces away from Taiwan long enough to finish the conquest. This will also include non-military measures. Fourth, the Chinese must defeat the Taiwanese army and conquer the island.

Surprise
Surprise will be important. The Taiwanese military has problems but it is far from toothless. And US and Japanese naval and air power are capable of defeating the Chinese at sea and in the air. With tensions high over the obviously increased Chinese military capabilities and their long history of saying that Taiwan must be absorbed into China, a nice charm offensive will be in order to lull potential enemies. In late 2007, China could initiate or accept more cross-Strait talks on various issues. They might even—in the spirit of the Olympics—suggest talks on how to have the Taiwan athletes march in the opening ceremonies. Perhaps behind a symbolic contingent of all Chinese marching under the PRC flag, the remaining Chinese athletes will march in under flags of their home provinces, so the Taiwanese could march under the Taiwanese flag. Whatever the details, the point will be that the warm fuzzy of the Olympics will be used to create a false thaw after years of tension.

With the Olympics to protect, the Chinese will have a perfect cover for a general mobilization and heightening of military readiness and activity to mask attack preparations. If the Chinese move infantry units around by sea transport it will get the world used to this activity. You can't hide all attack preparations so just make sure nobody suspects the real reason for the military activity. Remember, achieving surprise doesn't require you to hide all your activities; it requires you to make sure the enemy interprets what they see in a manner that leads the enemy to miss the obvious and fail to connect the dots.

The Chinese should also announce in late 2007 and early 2008 lots of lucrative purchase deals with Canadians, Europeans, Japanese, and even American firms. If the Chinese can quickly conquer Taiwan, this will increase the calls for peace by lots of nations or companies eager to keep those contracts intact.

Setting Up the Invasion
First, the Chinese will want to isolate the battlefield. This will start a week before the opening shots.

The Chinese should arrange an accident in the Panama Canal that blocks the waterway quite solidly for a good two weeks. Perhaps a volatile cargo will make it too risky to move fast until all the facts are in about the cargo and what it will take to secure it before refloating the ship and getting it out of the locks. Our carriers may not be able to use the canal but smaller warships and supply vessels use it, not to mention pure civilian traffic that relies on the canal. The disruption will hinder our movement and provide a warning jolt to our economy.

Chinese activities in Cuba and Venezuela will also be heightened to distract the US in our own hemisphere and make us wary of sending power to the Taiwan region. These two nations will be encouraged to act up to add to the distraction.

My guess is that the Chinese will not try to encourage the North Koreans to invade to distract us. Assuming North Korea is even around then, the Chinese will restrain Pyongyang. My guess is that the need for a localized war will preclude such a distraction. A Korean and Taiwan wars at the same time will make it seem like a general Chinese offensive and make it easier for the US to intervene—not harder. We do react to big enough threats. If done, this would be hard to ignore.

Pre-H Hour Activities
The actual invasion will have started before the shooting starts. Special forces and intelligence officers will infiltrate Taiwan, placing navigation aids to guide parachutists and missiles, and preparing for direct attacks on Taiwanese strategic assets. They might even stock warehouses with consumable supplies and vehicles to be used by the invaders.

Civilian merchant ships on scheduled arrivals will be loaded with supplies, weapons, and light infantry battalions and will sail into Taiwanese ports on both coasts.

China's nuclear ballistic missile subs put to sea.

Some older PLAN submarines outfitted as minelayers will set sail on training missions and arrive off the east coast of Taiwan prior to H-Hour.

The Chinese should also initiate cyberwarfare against Taiwan on a massive and continuing scale and small attacks against the US, Japan, and European countries that end within a few hours. The message to the West will be look at Taiwan and what we can do and look at how we penetrated your security. Don't mess with us. This will start at the moment of attack, H-Hour.

The Chinese should also announce that for the duration of the internal suppression of separatists, they will exercise all due caution by holding their dollars and treasury bills and other foreign currencies in order to prevent this unfortunate internal event from impacting the global economy. They will also announce that they are halting all oil imports as a safety measure against any Taiwanese attacks that could imperil the health of the sea and assure the Chinese people that Chinese oil reserves are more than adequate to supply China's needs while the separatists on Taiwan are brought to heel.

The threat of breaking the world's economy, the promise of refraining from doing so if the world stands aside, and the boast that China can ride out the loss of oil imports for an unknown amount of time will be designed to keep the world neutral, pro-Peking, or at least delay a decision to side with Taiwan.

H-Hour
Warships, amphibious warfare, and drafted commercial ships loaded with troops put to sea and aircraft take off.

For the first impact, Chinese special forces and intelligence operatives hit radar stations, assassinate leaders, sabotage crucial bridges and tunnels, hit Patriot missile sites and communication centers, anti-ship missile batteries, ammunition depots, and strike at air fields.

The light infantry on the merchant ships in Taiwanese harbors will unload and attempt to seize the ports on the west coast or, on the east coast, sabotage facilities and otherwise prevent the Americans and Japanese from using them to reinforce the Taiwanese. Their very presence will deter or at least delay reinforcements.

A ballistic missile barrage will hit Taiwanese airfields, naval bases, army barracks and vehicle parks, leadership targets, air defense and anti-ship missile batteries, and ammunition depots shortly thereafter. Perhaps the Chinese use electromagnetic pulse weapons to fry Taiwanese electronics. Perhaps the Chinese use chemical weapons. This is Chinese territory after all and so not an inter-state issue. The chemicals won't kill many but they will slow down the Taiwanese who will have to avoid contamination, decontaminate, and otherwise cope. It will also tend to show the Taiwanese that the Chinese are deadly serious.

Taiwanese officers turned by the Chinese may order their units to disband or stand down; or Taiwanese units may be given confusing or ineffective orders by defecting officers or Chinese psychological warfare units that will mimic Taiwanese authorities. These actions may take Taiwanese units out of the fight or at least delay them. How many will be vulnerable I do not know, but any defections or collapsing units will demoralize the loyal units and leave Taiwan's leadership uncertain of the loyalty of the military. When trust is broken, people may look to save themselves at the first hint of their own defeat.

Air attacks will follow quickly, with obsolete aircraft thrown into the battle without regard for losses while the higher tech stuff is used more carefully. Possibly their role will be to secure an air corridor for the airborne assault to come. The Taiwanese pilots will at least tire themselves out swatting the old Chinese aircraft out of the sky.

A dribble of ballistic missiles will continue to hit Taiwanese airfields to disrupt operations and slow sortie rates with aircraft continuing to roll in regardless of losses. Even crappy 1960s-era aircraft can knock out modern fighters if they are on a runway refueling and rearming.

The Chinese will drop their parachute divisions near Taipei to go right for the jugular by seizing the center of government. (I've read the Chinese can lift 22,000 in one day so this should be possible.) With an airfield secured, the Chinese will airlift their urban cavalry division to march on the capital itself. The parachute units will try to cordon off the capital to keep reinforcements from coming in to the rescue.

[Let me link to a later post showing that an amphibious assault can aim for Taipei, too.]

Broadcasts will urge the Taiwanese military to stand aside. Some might. The Chinese will announce that unlawful combatants, which will include all the Taiwanese military, will not be treated as POWs but as criminals. The Chinese will claim the world considers this an internal matter and give wide play to any real statements to that effect. If any US Senator urges caution in reacting, that too will be played to the Taiwanese. The Chinese want the 23 million Taiwanese to feel alone and facing the power of 1.3 billion Chinese charging hard at them. Of course, ethnic solidarity will be emphasized and the pride of a powerful China able to end the long humiliation at the hands of the West will be used to convince Taiwanese soldiers to defect or go home.

The Chinese will also announce that all of "their" ports on the island of Taiwan are now closed, enforced by minefields and submarines. And with Chinese troops on the ground coming off their merchant ships where they hid, a physical presence will add to the statement.

Qemoy and Matsu will come under artillery and air attack and the Chinese will make it look like they will be targeted with invasion. Perhaps vaguely worded statements and quiet messages sent to foreign governments will try to convey the impression that the Chinese aren't really going for Taiwan but are just going to reclaim Quemoy, Matsu, and the Pescadores Islands. Kind of like an October War strategy of the Egyptians to grab the Suez Canal to break the impasse rather than being an invasion to drive all the way to Tel Aviv. Keeping the fact that China is going for the whole ball of wax for as long as possible will help delay any US and Japanese intervention.

Major fleet elements of the PLAN, including their carrier battle group(s), will deploy to the north and east of Taiwan to complicate any American or Japanese decision to send forces to help Taiwan.

The Main Invasion
The amphibious invasion will not look like D-Day in 1944 despite the many claims that it would be impossible for the Chinese to pull of a Normandy-style invasion. The Chinese simply won’t be carrying out a D-Day-style invasion. Remember, the Germans held an Atlantic Wall in some strength. The ports were rigged for demolitions and the allies had to land on beaches and then take ports. The objectives were the ports but the ports were too highly defended to attack directly. If the ports hadn’t been defended and rigged to blow, we would have hit the ports rather than use a more difficult over-the-beach approach.

The peacetime Taiwanese army will largely be in their barracks or struggling to reach the coast where the Chinese will be hitting relatively undefended and operating ports. If subversion or psychological warfare operations against the Taiwanese army are successful, not all units will move to fight the Chinese and the ones that do will be wary of their neighbors and so will fight and move more cautiously. Leadership will hesitate moving units because they will be unsure of loyalties. Slowing down the reaction of the Taiwanese units will aid the Chinese in heading inland and securing ports.

China's modern diesel-electric submarines will screen the northern and southern entries to the Taiwan Strait. They will mine the gaps with the subs backing up the minefields and protecting them from minesweepers.

The PLANs amphibious warfare ships will be used to lift the Chinese marines to the Pescadores Islands to seize that position as a staging area for helicopters and air cushion vehicles to shuttle follow-up forces to Taiwan itself. This will also have the effect of nullifying the anti-ship missiles based there.

With light infantry already unloaded from civilian shipping in Taiwan's harbors, the invasion force will sail in to reinforce them. Obsolete warships, either converted into troop ships or just emptied of most ammunition and crammed with troops, will make a high speed dash for the ports. Merchant ships taken into the service of the PLAN will begin lifting 9 divisions of infantry from widely spread ports. Roll on/roll off ships will carry heavy armor and artillery to unload in the ports. From the Pescadores, additional forces will be sent against the beaches of Taiwan with the amphibious warfare assets and air cushion vehicles to spread the Taiwanese out.

Forces will move out as soon as possible to head inland and relieve the airborne assault forces at Taipei. With Taiwanese brigades dribbling in (or not, depending on psychological warfare, special operations, and air attacks), the Chinese will try to keep the ports out of Taiwanese artillery range.

If the US intervenes, the Chinese will use whatever anti-satellite weapons they have and will try to slow down the US by threatening us with attack. I think they will refrain from striking first but will put forces in positions that will be threatening to us if left alone. The time it will take for the US to decide to engage Chinese PLAN forces will be valuable. The Chinese will sacrifice their fleet to take Taiwan, if necessary. They think long-term, remember? So what if they need another twenty years to rebuild what we sink?

With some luck, Chinese forces will be sitting in control of Taiwan, with the substantial forces on Qemoy and Matsu (I think a quarter of the Taiwanese army is on these two islands; though I read they have decided wisely to pull most back to the mainland at some point) left to surrender after seeing the defeat of the main Taiwanese defenses. American and Japanese forces gathering to intervene will now face not an intervention but a counter-attack with no Taiwanese military units to rescue. Ideally, monsoon season will be starting soon, giving the Chinese time to prepare defenses before October. European leaders may be calling for calm lest the fragile world economy be sent into a tailspin. With a puppet government set up on Taiwan recognized by Peking and as many states as China can get to issue supportive statements, the effort to portray this as an internal manner will be hammered home. And the longer a counter-invasion is delayed, the less likely it will happen.

And Taiwan will be part of China, as the Chinese communists have said they intend to accomplish for nearly sixty years.

Counter-Measures
No plan survives contact with the enemy, of course, and this is just a scenario that assumes the Chinese plan goes like clockwork. It could. But probably not. So to ward off all those who will protest that I don’t consider what our side will do, here are some of the things that could throw a stick into their spokes:

The Chinese could stumble at their home ports and screw up the loading, taking too much time and failing to maintain a tight schedule of throwing units across the strait.

The Chinese missile and air attack could fail to disrupt the Taiwanese air force. The Taiwanese might then shoot down the air transports and rocket the invasion flotillas.

Taiwan could figure out what the Chinese are doing and prevent the Chinese from seizing quickly seizing ports on the main island.

The Pescadores Islands could hold out and strike the invasion fleet with shore-based missiles. The Chinese amphibious follow-up attacks from here could be eliminated.

Taiwan’s navy might not be Pearl Harbored and make it to sea to attack the invasion fleet.

Taiwan’s two reasonably recent subs could get to sea. (The two other Taiwanese subs are museum pieces.)

The US or Japan might intervene promptly. Stryker brigade elements could be landed quickly to bolster Taiwanese morale. Marines from Japan could sail in to clean out the Chinese-held ports. More US Patriots could be flown in. Japanese and American F-15 aircraft might fly from Japan to fly cover using aerial refueling or some might base out of Taiwan itself. American carriers might be able to operate east of Taiwan to hit the invasion fleet. Ships and subs with anti-ship missiles might get in the act, too. P-3s could nail the Chinese diesels guarding the invasion corridor, leaving the merchant ship vulnerable to attack by Taiwanese, Japanese, and American subs and ships.

Long-range American bombers from Guam might slam the Chinese invasion flotilla or even hit Chinese airbases on China itself. Though I imagine we’d keep the fight localized by not striking the mainland. We might destroy the Chinese newly set up base on the Pescadores or the ports held by China.

Taiwanese units might not be vulnerable to psy ops or defection and instead move out promptly to crush the air- and sea bridgeheads while they are most vulnerable.

Taiwanese missiles might target Chinese assets on the mainland and discourage the Chinese people by the fact that the war is brought to them.

Who Will Win?
Like any war, it will be a fight to see if the Chinese can do enough right to balance out what they fail to do. Their success will depend on maintaining momentum in the face of losses that may be higher than Peking thinks likely. It will depend on whether Taiwanese morale holds.

I’m just saying that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the very near future is not out of the realm of possibility. It may be possible right now. Asserting it is (or will be) impossible does not make it so. Pointing out all the things we or the Taiwanese might do doesn’t mean we will or can do them, and doesn’t consider that China knows all those things and so will plan to defeat our plan. Pointing out the challenges China has to overcome doesn’t mean China won’t overcome enough of them to win.

We and the Japanese and Taiwanese need to take the threat seriously and prepare our forces to repel such an invasion. Being prepared is the best way to ensure that the Chinese won’t try to invade and that the Olympics will be remembered for a doping scandal or two and perhaps questions about communist judges in the women’s gymnastics events.

The communist Chinese want Taiwan very much. Even if the Chinese are doomed to defeat in a war over Taiwan, if the rulers in Peking think they can win there will be a war. That alone will be bad enough.

And the Chinese might win.

/END TRILOGY/

Here are my thoughts in Military Review about the need to drive the PLA into the sea.