Syria's Multi-War is Transforming Rather Than Ending
Can any Syria minority trust the Islamist-ridden government?
I expected Alawites—who were the core supporters of Assad—and possibly other minorities that relied on Assad for protection from the majority Sunni Arabs to resist the HTS victors despite the collapse of the Assad regime to the HTS-led jihadis and other rebels. I don't think HTS is as reformed as it claims. And even if not the most radical of jihadis, the radical jihadis in the constellation of HTS allies will push HTS to be more radical and violent. As jihadis are. Is resistance to HTS forming?
ISW reports that HTS isn't prepared to allow for regional autonomy in any form:
Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al Shara detailed a three-to-four-year timeline for building new Syrian state, during which he presumably would rule and could heavily influence the allocation of political power. Shara articulated this vision, marking his most detailed articulation of the state formation process yet, in an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya. He said that he expects writing a constitution will take three years and organizing elections will take four years. Shara justified the long election timeline by emphasizing the need to conduct a “comprehensive population census” for election results to be “valid.” Shara acknowledged that he has appointed HTS members to most major ministries as a “necessity” but that the “National Dialogue Conference” will fully represent Syria’s diversity and be empowered to vote to rebuild the Syrian legal code. This interview is the latest in Shara’s effort to portray himself to international audiences as a moderate leader and distance himself from his extremist al Qaeda in Iraq and al Nusra Front background.
ISW also reports signs of resistance to the HTS-led conquerors:
HTS has launched a series of raids targeting former Assad regime members in northwestern Syria but has faced resistance in former Assad strongholds. Unspecified Syrian opposition fighters continue to target the Alawite community fueling distrust and accusations that arrests conducted by the HTS-led security forces are driven by sectarianism and not in pursuit of justice for crimes committed under the former regime. CTP-ISW cannot verify the vast majority of these attacks, but the informational effect generated by the rumors of ethnically- or sectarian-motivated attacks could still drive a cycle of violence between minority communities and the HTS-led coalition, which is predominantly but not solely Sunni Arab. The HTS-led government has attempted to assuage concerns and reassure the Alawite community that it intends to protect the rights of minorities but has taken few concrete steps to do so.
The Syrian Popular Resistance labeled the HTS-led coalition as “Kharijites,” which derogatorily frames the coalition as heretical. The statement by the Syrian Popular Resistance comes as nascent opposition against HTS has appeared, especially along the Syrian coast, which is predominantly populated by the Alawite minority. It is possible that the Syrian Popular Resistance is affiliated with this activity, though CTP-ISW cannot verify the exact nature and origin of the group. Growing conflict between HTS and minority and opposition groups would fuel sectarian tensions, drive an escalation cycle, and risk destabilizing Syria further. Although HTS leader Ahmed al Shara has repeatedly used tempered and inclusive rhetoric in recent weeks, he would struggle to contain such a cycle of violence given some of the extreme Salafi-jihadi and sectarian actors that constitute his coalition.
An unknown amount of reports may not be fully accurate, but the reports will tend to fuel friction and fear and make even false reports come true. Will HTS efforts to reassure minorities even as it seeks to control them reduce or create resistance?
The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Military Operations Department continued to conduct raids to detain former Regime members that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm on January 1 and 2. Interim government forces also engaged “remnants of an Iranian-backed militia” in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on January 1.
Negotiations with Minorities in Syria: The HTS-led interim Syrian government appears to be taking initial steps to secure cooperation with minority religious communities ahead of the Syrian National Dialogue Conference.
The Alawites seem to be in a wait-and-see stance about the Sunni Arab HTS:
The Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria released a statement on January 3 expressing its support for the interim Syrian government but argued that the interim government, though it has stated it seeks to respect all Syrians, has so far failed to back words with action.
Or at least saying “nice doggie” while it reaches for a rock:
The Syrian Resistance Movement, which announced its existence in December 2024, is likely a pro-Assad armed group and has begun to frame its operations in Assadist language.
I’ll add that HTS efforts to crush the Kurdish minority as the price Turkey demands for its crucial help to overthrow Assad—and to remain in power—won’t reassure other minorities.
As I noted early after the HTS battlefield victory, Syrians aren't enjoying freedom. They are enjoying a power vacuum. That vacuum is for now being visibly filled—at least on paper if not in the local towns or countryside—by the former HTS rebels. New rebels—or perhaps more accurately, separatists—could fill that practical vacuum.
Remember too that Baathist resistance in Iraq took months to organize after the rapid and unexpected (by the Baathists) destruction and collapse of Saddam's regime in early 2003. Organizing the foreign Sunni jihadi invasion from Iran-dominated Syria and the Iranian Iraqi Shia proxy terror campaign took even longer. In time, the Baathists failed and its remnants migrated into the Sunni side of the terrorist campaigns (before that Sunni Arab terrorists were ultimately defeated during the Surge and Awakening).
I may not have been wrong in my assessment about the Alawites. Reality may simply be taking time to assert itself on the ground. My views on the divisions in Syria in this old post on the post-Syria Assad regime may be of interest.
NOTE: The map is from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).