The Aircraft Carrier Debate Resumes

Is the carrier obsolete? Not yet. Sort of. But let's examine the Definitions Section

America needs sea power to survive. America needs to protect the New World it exists in; and to project power to the Old World to thrive as a prosperous and free republic free from attack or isolation. The form of that necessary sea power should not be limited by assuming any form of sea power is the key to controlling the seas.

This author argues the super carrier is becoming obsolete:

Military planners and strategists can no longer ignore the vulnerabilities of aircraft carriers. Missile technology is only going to get better—and much like the battleships before them, aircraft carrier technology has inbuilt physical limits that cannot be overcome. But this does not mean that navies across the world must be made redundant. They just need to adapt.

One doesn’t have to agree with the author on how the Navy adapts. But he’s right. The proliferation of enemy missiles operating under a persistent surveillance and targeting network allows an enemy to mass effects on an expensive carrier.

This same missile and targeting network allows the Navy to mass effects from dispersed and cheap assets. The super carrier is a weapon from the era when massing effects required a large platform like the super carrier. Or many super carriers in a single group.

But the author does say they are becoming obsolete. Every year we see them doing something useful whether it is fighting the Houthi, blasting terrorist camps with aircraft strikes, or responding to a natural disaster.

This author denies that the super carrier is obsolete. But he offers context:

What these [naval power] theorists understood—seemingly lost amid the clamor over the supposed end of the carrier—is that there is a marked distinction between the act of securing sea control (perhaps through decisive battle, perhaps not) and the exercise of this control in some limited capacity after the fact.

Exactly! And that is why I stand with the carriers are obsolete side. Oh, I’m not in favor of getting rid of them. I do in fact recognize aircraft role in what that author calls the exercise of sea control. I just call it “power projection.” I don’t think they are the best platforms for securing sea control. They can be used either during peacetime against small powers or during great power war after securing sea control. Which I fortunately use the same term to describe.

For years I’ve argued that proponents and opponents of carrier dominance in our Navy force structure seemingly argue apples and oranges past each other. Proponents argue their value in power projection missions while opponents argue their inability to conduct sea control missions in the face of new threats.

Do we now have a seeming agreement that carriers are still useful but that the usefulness is less than what it was in the past?

My conclusion, when I explored the issue nearly twenty-five years ago, is that we don’t need nearly as many super carriers for the exercise of sea control and that we can slow down building them until we have fewer as they age out:

Coming to terms with the implications of networks and eventually phasing out the carriers over decades will allow the Navy to evolve and continue to fulfill its valuable roles of peacetime engagement; deterrence and conflict prevention; and fighting and winning. We must be prepared to let the Navy’s large aircraft carriers take their well-earned place in our history along with our fir-built frigates, gritty river ironclads, and the battle line of dreadnoughts. If the Navy sends carriers into battle beyond their time, they will have their fine reputations tarnished even if the United States overcomes naval setbacks to emerge victorious in a war. The United States Navy, even without carriers as its centerpiece, will still be a vital asset to the nation and will carry on a tradition of excellence that will bring America pride in the post-Nimitz Navy defined by network-centric warfare.

I could see the era of a platform-centric Navy coming to the end in favor of a network-centric Navy.

How many should we maintain? I don’t know. Six? What size should they be? Current super carriers (like Nimitz or Ford classes), medium carriers (like modern British or French carriers—or our old Midway class if you prefer), or light carriers (like our modern America-class big deck amphibs)? That’s outside my lane.

More recently, I wrote that we really need to stop trying to preserve the super carrier as the apex predator of the blue waters by spending money to prevent them from being expensive prey. Scarce resources are better spent on adapting the Navy to the new environment. The Navy is for sea control and not for keeping alive the glories of the aircraft carrier in epic Pacific sea battles from 1942 to 1945.

As I’ve begged repeatedly, I would like a sea power debate and not another futile carrier debate that doesn’t distinguish between their missions. We absolutely need a Navy capable of winning sea control and exploiting sea control. I guess I’m happy that these two articles placed together in Real Clear Defense, seemingly meant to offer point and counter-point, have found some common ground in the question of the super carrier in our fleet.

I truly am an optimist, aren’t I?

NOTE: I made the image with the Substack capability.