The Battle for the Buffer Zone

Why do so many Westerners only approve of Russia's?

Why are so many Westerners ready to accept Russia’s need for a buffer zone in Europe? And why do they not even recognize America’s need for a buffer zone in Europe?

Russia fears invasion from the west. Pointing out that the West approves of revolts by people to overthrow pro-Russian thug rulers in Ukraine is not exactly a defense of Russia’s effort to build a buffer. It was and expression of Ukrainian desire to reject subjugation to a brutal Russian overlord.

And “understanding” why Russia wants a buffer in flat Europe in the west does not mean we should “accept” Russia’s objective. Indeed, the West has more of a reason to want a buffer given Russia’s clear intent to destroy free democracies to build Russia’s buffer.

Well yes, Russia has a fear of invasion from the west:

Two and a half years ago, Russia invaded Ukraine, a former part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The reason for the invasion was geostrategic: Moscow justifiably feared that a hostile power could invade it from the west through Ukraine and up from the south. Such was the case for invasions by Napoleon and Hitler. Without strategic depth, Russia has no buffers.

The fear exists despite the post-Cold War shrinkage of NATO military power to the point of near irrelevance. But at least the author—who I respect even if I don’t always agree—clearly recognizes that a flat buffer zone works both ways:

For Russia, that no one was currently planning such an invasion meant little. Geopolitics demands preparing to defend against an enemy before the enemy plans to attack. Moscow was, after all, painfully aware that pro-West forces supported an uprising that unseated a pro-Russia president several years earlier. The West’s support was based on the fear that Russia would invade Ukraine and, in time, the rest of Europe. Neither side’s fears were irrational.

By Russia’s logic, no buffer zone in the west is enough. When Russian forces sat on the Elbe River inside a divided Germany, Russia wanted the Rhine River as their frontier. So I don’t trust the Russians when they say they can be satisfied with a buffer from former Soviet territories. The logic doesn’t work that way:

And who believes that Russia thinks that even owning all of Ukraine would provide enough security on their western border when the Red Army sitting in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary wasn't sufficiently to the west for Russia to believe that their successful defense could rest on something less ambitious than a lunge to the Rhine River?

Face it, if Russia got Ukraine, suddenly having a deferential Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland would be something that Russia would naturally (as any great power would!) expect.

That's the way it works. If Russia gets a buffer that protects their territory, before long that buffer is their territory that itself needs a buffer to protect it.

Lather, rinse, repeat, and pretty soon Russia is worrying about Britain across the English Channel and figuring that Hadrian's Wall would be a nice buffer line.

And then you have to remember that America needs a buffer zone to keep enemies from descending on America from bases across the Atlantic Ocean:

Europe is America's first line of defense in the Atlantic. I'd rather keep the Russians as far east as possible where America's role is limited to providing material and financial help rather than expending the lives of American troops to hold the line. That's a major reason I support Ukraine strongly. You may think I'm overstating the threat. But that's only because we've kept that threat away for so long. Let's look at the Atlantic threat.

As an American, I’m going to go with defending our need for a buffer zone at the expense of Russia’s proclaimed need. I say keep Russia as far east as possible.

Eventually the Russian may remember that China is the real threat and that NATO is not.