Western countries have little experience coping with an air bombardment campaign, whether against civilian targets or the military in the field. Well, little recent experience. Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) units used to be a major component of Western defenses until World War II aerial supremacy made AAA an Army expense better spent elsewhere. The situation got even safer after winning the Cold War. More Army air defense assets were disbanded. Stop wringing our hands about this “new” problem and make what was once common—ground-based air defense units—a priority again.
This discussion of the challenge Ukraine faces from aerial attack is interesting:
If Ukraine only had the deal with the different Shahed variants, which also include decoy versions of the drone, the problem would be huge. But, most Shahed raids are accompanied by smaller numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles which are difficult to detect, and much more complex to intercept that Shaheds.
But land force air defence units need to focus on another major threat besides the challenge of Russia’s nightly deep strikes against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. That other problem is tactical air defence along the frontline.
Russia’s tactical fixed wing aviation remains a critical threat to Ukrainian ground forces. Russian tactical fighter bombers are able launch glide bombs from ranges beyond Ukrainian ground-based air defence systems. These glide bombs continue to be a serious threat to ground forces because there remains no reliable, systemic way of intercepting them. And they carry a very large warhead, much larger than any drone, which can destroy significant fortifications manned by Ukrainian troops, which provides gaps for Russian ground troops to exploit.
Pondering how to cope with insufficient assets neglects just how much manpower and equipment used to be devoted to air defense before American air power guaranteed air supremacy against manned aircraft threats.
Still, the glide bomb attacks—175 per day—are devastating because the front is static. This aerial bombardment is not the same as close air support. Russia can stand off and unleash those large bombs because they pinpoint a stationary target long before the planes take off. This doesn’t change the fact that Ukraine must cope with the attacks. But it does suggest this isn’t something that we should look at as a purely defensive problem. We’d bomb their airfields. Left-of-boom, right?
But I digress.
In 1938 there were only 5 Regular Army and thirteen National Guard regiments, but by 1941 this had been expanded to 37 total regiments. In November 1942, 781 battalions were authorized. However, this number was pared down to 331 battalions by the end of the war. On 9 March 1942 Antiaircraft Command was established in Washington D.C. and in 1944 the AAA school was moved to Fort Bliss. Army Anti-Aircraft Command (ARAACOM) was created July 1950, and in 1957, ARAACOM was renamed to US Army Air Defense Command (USARADCOM).
Look again at all the troops in that World War II battery in the photo. Multiply that across the Army. And across our allies. And certainly our enemies found they could never set aside ground-based air defense in the face of Allied tactical and strategic air power. Indeed, German air defense at the front suffered to devote assets to protect the homeland.
And really, even as Allied armies returned to the continent on D-Day for the final campaign, Britain had to cope with what Ukraine battles today, V-1 suicide drones (that could be downed with traditional air defense means) and V-2 ballistic missiles (that could not be shot down) that bypassed much of the fighter aircraft power that kept German planes from threatening Britain:
Soon after the invasion of Normandy, the first V-1 flying bomb struck England (June 13). ... Terror attacks by these weapons on London severely shook English morale, despite the fact that about half the V-1s were shot down by antiaircraft or fighter defenses. The terror became more serious when the Germans introduced the V-2, the first effective long-range rocket missile (September 8). Because of their speed, these rockets could not be intercepted. [See page 1101 of Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (2nd. Rev. Ed.)]
Blue skies air supremacy didn’t prevent Germany from bombarding Britain. The threat was finally subdued by the Allied ground offensive that captured launch sites.
So the challenge today is really a challenge because we stopped thinking about what had once been an integral part of the defense establishment—air defense units at home and in the field that soak up a lot of manpower and money.
And sure, the Air Force can join the air defense party—while doing the basic things to protect their bases.
Boy do we have to think about air defense again. Make it so and stop trying to over-complicate the problem. This is at its foundation a matter of men and materiel to create air defense units in the numbers and variety needed.
I’ve already advocated more auto-cannons for the Navy. And what about using suicide drones for point defense against missiles? Those could work for ships, too.
But I once again digress, at least partially.
Both battlefield and homeland air defense certainly make sense for the Army given the past need as a template for what what must be done again. The Air Force has dominated the blue skies over our troops since 1944. The brown skies—as I’ve called the air space low over the dirt and mud where the troops fight—are not under our control now.
Heck, the Army has been allowed to have small fixed wing aircraft before. Why not have an air defense version of the A-29 light attack plane? But does it need fancy lasers that increase its price? It’s no fighter drone as I advocated in Army magazine years ago (and where I coined the “brown skies” term"), but it will add to the needed volume of assets and reinforce areas or units under higher threat.
NOTE: The photo includes an uncle of mine somewhere in that picture.