To the Shores of Hudaydah

What can the Tripolitan War teach us about dealing with the Houthi Red Sea protection racket

Commander Salamander notes a United Nations report that the Houthi are getting tribute to let some merchant ships pass unmolested (apparently quoting the unlinked report):

"The Houthis allegedly collected illegal fees from a few shipping agencies to allow their ships to sail through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden without being attacked," the UN report says, quoting anonymous sources. "The sources estimate the Houthis' earnings from these illegal safe-transit fees to be about $180 million [€169 million] per month."

This money is transferred to the Houthis via the informal network of money transfers known as "hawala," the report continues.

These fees could add up to about $2.2 billion (€2 billion) a year and would be one of the Houthis' largest income streams. They might also give the group a financial incentive to continue their attacks, no matter what happens in Gaza and Lebanon, observers say.

Yeah, their cheap missiles and drones might not cut into protection racket profit margins very much.

He makes the accurate connection to the early 19th century Tripolitan Wars, where American forces confronted North African pirate kingdoms nominally part of the Ottoman Empire which extorted tribute from European states and America to refrain from capturing their merchant shipping and enslaving their crews for labor (or worse) or ransom.

Back then, European states normally found it useful to pay in order to focus their power on each other in the Napoleonic Wars. And having the pirates attack rivals or enemies was outsourcing war to those with a financial incentive.

America sent ships first to deter and when that failed, to fight. The loss of the frigate Philadelphia, lured by the Tripolitans into grounding off of Tripoli harbor, led to more force that bombarded Tripoli with much fury but without decisive effect. The local ruler, the Bashaw, considered sending the captured crew of our frigate inland beyond reach of ship cannons or landing parties. Eventually, a small Marine contingent with a mercenary army of some Greeks and numerous Arabs marched from Egypt with a rival to the Tripoli throne, eventually capturing Derna with Navy fire support, and frightening the ruler into ending the war by releasing the Navy prisoners and ending the tribute—although a one-time ransom was paid for the American prisoners.

Today, with China already seemingly exempt from Houthi attacks (and don’t forget their Iranian paymasters, targeting support, and arms suppliers). Now other states or companies are paying the Houthi.

And indeed, as the report notes, the Houthi now have incentive to keep shooting to keep the money rolling in. Especially if Iran becomes unable to support the Houthi in the lifestyle to which they’ve become accustomed.

The problem is that today’s Red Sea Regatta has been mostly on the defensive. The Navy approach risks the probability that after repeated low-odds attacks that the Navy swats aside that one will get through. As the attacks approach infinity, a single Houthi success becomes almost impossible to avoid.

The original Tripolitan War demonstrated that, as I wrote about in Army magazine late last century when the big Navy thing was … From the Sea views on projecting power in the littorals, victory ashore is difficult from the sea:

Despite the changes in the Services during the last 200 years, the differences between today’s potential sea battles and those near the shores of Tripoli are small. The Tripolitan War, which shows how the Navy may be employed in practice to combat regional threats in limited wars from the sea, also highlights the weaknesses in its application. The most important lesson is that the Navy and Marine Corps should not believe they can dominate littoral warfare. The navy may well dominate the sea portion of the littorals, and, indeed, the Army needs a Navy strong enough to carry out this role. However, the Navy will never be able to overwhelm an enemy under the restrictions inherent in littoral warfare. For decisive victory, a strong U.S. Army will always be required to exploit the initial gains of the Navy and marine Corps.

Still, with no American hostages in Houthi hands, it may be possible for the United States to use more aggressive bombardment to destroy the Houthi means of attacking ships in the Red Sea. And destroying port infrastructure to stop smuggling. And perhaps legal options can strangle payments from the source. Also, if the Houthi are distinguishing between those who pay and those who don’t, how are the Houthi doing that? Does Iran provide data? Does Russia? Or are the safe ships broadcasting their location to the Houthi to avoid attack? Can we obstruct whatever method the Houthi are using? Or spoof the means to make all ships look protected?

And could America get local allies to help on the ground as did in the first Tripolitan War? We once did that until in 2021 we decided the Saudis were unworthy of our support as they fought the Houthi on the ground and with an air campaign (quoting an article cited in that post):

President Joe Biden is cutting off US support for "offensive operations" in Yemen and appointing a special envoy to push for a diplomatic solution to end the six-year civil war.

We wouldn’t even let an ally conduct offensive operations against a common enemy. And here we are in 2025, letting the Houthi hang around and giving them a chance to hit one of our warships if they just keep trying.

NOTE: I made the image with the Substack capability.