When Counting On Others to Protect America Failed

The decline of Britain and the rise of the American global role

Today, too often I read about how America should pull back from the world and let local allies defend America without our effort. Those allies have incentive to defend themselves, such authors say. So why should we spend to help them do what they would do anyway?

Well, that common objective might not last. And worse, allies might not be able to defend themselves—and America as a bonus—for long.

Let’s consider Britain’s ability to defend America’s Atlantic coast after the unfortunate events spoiling our relationship from the Revolution to the War of 1812 finally faded. Our Civil War highlighted both our inability to keep either Britain or France from descending on our coast to support the Confederacy; and jolted Britain into realizing there was no way Britain could defend Canada if America got serious about conquering Canada. Thus the seeds for the special relationship were planted.

America needs to control the Atlantic to keep our coast from being our first line of defense. And with Britain no longer trying to recapture America, Britain’s defense of freedom of the seas benefited America which could largely rely on Britain to be the major power to defend trade and they peace to conduct it. The Pax Britannica was designed to protect Britain. It only happened to benefit America as a side effect.

But that side effect was not universal in all circumstances.

The Spanish-American War was largely fought on this side of the Atlantic. Britain did not intercept the Spanish fleet that crossed the Atlantic.

America intervened late in World War I as Atlantic Ocean security was shown to be at the mercy of hostile European powers. Britain and France could not protect the Atlantic from German military power (the U-boat war on shipping). And recall that before World War I, Germany had given thought to projecting naval and land power across the Atlantic to attack America.

America had eased into World War II—seeing the Atlantic again under threat with isolated Britain hard pressed to protect itself let alone encompass the defense of American interests—when Japan struck American territory in the Pacific, including Pearl Harbor. At least Hawaii stood in the way of America’s west coast.

After World War II, America took steps to prevent oceans from being highways for enemies to strike us. We organized alliances and did not fully demobilize our forces as was our past practice. And we made sure our defense-industrial base remained robust in peacetime. People forget that Eisenhower’s warning about a military-industrial complex included recognition of the imperative need for it in a hostile world. That effort led to victory over the Soviet threat without a hot war breaking out, risking nuclear war.

Now many Americans want to walk away from Europe and let Europeans defend our interests without America needing to spend much at all. Oh, the impulse is dressed up as wise or hard-headed realism. But it is retreat. And it is based on the hope others will defend us. Britain sure can’t. And if your hope in Europe rests on the European Union defending us, forget that fantasy.

This is even worse than the “leading from behind” nonsense we were told would spare us the cost of actually leading. Even as we walk away saying we won’t be suckers and defend them, we think our allies will naturally have the same interests and will not feel like suckers defending America.

Returning home because we tire of supporting allies who support our objectives won’t work. Without the added power of those allies—and the resources and territory they control—defending America becomes much more difficult and expensive. And making sure the America we defend is a free republic might not be possible. This was a major reason I advocated keeping a Army Corps in Europe in Military Review (starting on p. 15) over two decades ago. I wanted an insurance policy in case a new threat from Russia arose.

And one has arisen in Putin’s Russia. Retreating from Europe no matter how you dress it up as hard-headed strategy as the threat gathers and grows would be strategic malpractice.

NOTE: The image was made with Substack capability.